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ORGANIZED LABOR AS SHAREHOLDER ACTIVIST:
BUILDING COALITIONS TO PROMOTE WORKER
CAPITALISM
Marleen A O'Connor*
Labor is prior to, and independent of, capital. Capital is
only the fruit of labor, and could never have existed if labor
had not first existed. Labor is the superior of capital, and
deserves much the higher consideration.
-Abraham Lincoln1
I. INTRODUCTION: WORKERS AS CAPITALISTS
In the past, the traditional question posed by unions was:
"which side are you on?"--presenting a clear choice between
labor and capital. As membership and bargaining power fall,
however, unions are asserting their rights as shareholders to
influence corporate decision making outside the conventional
labor law framework.2 Because the National Labor Relations
* I presented this paper at New York University's 50th Annual Conference on
Labor in May 1997, the Annual AFL-CIO Lawyers' Conference in June 1997, and the
International Conference on -Socio-Economics in July 1997. This article is current
through Feb. 16, 1998.
1. Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1861), in 5 THE COL-
LECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 1861-1862, at 52 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). I
thank Professor Ann Hodges at the University of Richmond School of Law for sharing
this quote with me.
2. For a path-breaking and comprehensive analysis of the labor law and securi-
ties regulations aspects of labor-shareholder activism, see Stewart J. Schwab &
Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor
Unions? , 96 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 1998); Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Mar-
tin, Should Labor Be Allowed To Make Shareholder Proposals?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 41
(1998).
The media has focused much attention on this issue. See Joann S. Lublin,
Labor Unions Brandish Stock to Force Change, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1996, at BI;
Diane Lewis, Unions Seeking Leverage as Shareholders, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 7, 1996,
at 71; Vineeta Anand, Labor Learns Lesson Well Unions Use Activism As Tool
Against Target Companies, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Apr. 3, 1995, at 24; Jeff
Cossette, A Consolidated Effort, INVESTOR REL., June 1, 1995, at 10.
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Act3 does not adequately protect workers' rights,4 unions have
devised innovative methods as shareholders to exercise unprece-
dented power over managers. In only a few years, labor-share-
holders have become highly visible players in the institutional
shareholder movement. As a group, labor-shareholders submit
one of the largest numbers of shareholder resolutions. Even
more significantly, they have one of the highest success rates in
obtaining passage of their proposals.5
In many cases, labor-shareholders target companies where
unions are involved in labor disputes as part of corporate cam-
paigns. At this early stage, the most meaningful progress made
by labor-shareholders is in building political-style coalitions.
The world of shareholder activism is a relatively small commu-
nity that is conventionally divided into two segments: (1) share-
holders concerned with corporate governance reforms and (2)
those seeking to promote corporate social responsibility. Unions
have allied with both factions, but in different ways.
Within the corporate governance realm, labor and other
shareholders have learned to overlook their differences concern-
ing wages and job security to rally around the one campaign
that unites them, minimizing managerial self-dealing. Labor-
shareholders focus most of their resolutions on issues pertaining
to executive compensation, staggered boards, board indepen-
dence, and poison pills. When labor-shareholders submit these
types of proposals, they obtain support from other institutional
investors, mainly public pension plans, which vote according to
guidelines favoring these corporate governance reforms.
Unions made limited use of this strategy in the past. See Ruth Kenner Thomp-
son, Union Use of Public Proxy Resolutions, 36 LAB. STUD. J. 40 (1988).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
4. In 1984, John Sweeney, President of the AFL-CIO, asserted: "my answer to
the question whether the National Labor Relations Act should be amended in simple:
NO! The National Labor Relations Act . . . is, for all practical purposes . . . dead."
John J. Sweeney, Is There a Need to Amend the National Labor Relations Act?, 62
FORDHAM L. REv. 1142, 1143 (1984).
5. For an extensive discussion, see Thomas & Martin, supra note 2, at 51-53.
6. Several scholars suggest that institutional investors are the group most likely
to resolve America's corporate governance problems. See Bernard S. Black, Sharehold-
er Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 575-91 (1990); Ronald J. Gilson &
Reiner Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Inves-
tors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 883-92 (1991).
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Within the social activist circle, unions find natural allies in
religious shareholder groups and socially responsible funds to
promote employment-related issues concerning sweatshops, child
labor, and diversity. Although rarely in the forefront of these
movements,' labor-shareholders vote in favor of these proposals
and work behind the scenes to provide assistance.' Unlike cor-
porate governance resolutions, social proposals do not receive
majority votes because public pension funds (with the exception
of the New York City Retirement Fund (NYCERS)) do not sup-
port these reforms. For the most part, public pension funds
view employment-related resolutions as raising social issues
rather than economic matters. But in the employment area, the
line separating corporate governance and social proposals is be-
coming increasingly blurred. Recent examples, such as the Tex-
aco controversy over race discrimination,s illustrate that em-
ployment matters can have significant economic impacts.
Labor-shareholders' coalitions with both corporate governance
reformers as well as social activists raise questions about the
extent to which labor-shareholders can further workers' inter-
ests within the boundaries of the shareholder-dominated corpo-
7. Labor-shareholders submitted 47 corporate governance proposals, versus the
following eight social proposals in 1997:
(1) Longview Fund's proposal to Dillard Department Stores to
report on overseas supplier labor standards;
(2) LongView Fund's proposal to the Limited to link executive com-
pensation to overseas labor standards;
(3) Communication Workers of America's proposal to Lockheed Mar-
tin to report on "conflicts of interest" legal compliance;
(4) Unite's proposal to May Department Stores to review compli-
ance with supplier labor standards;
(5) LongView Fund's proposal to Monsanto to report on equal em-
ployment;
(6) Unite's proposal to Phillips-Van Heusen to link executive pay to
overseas labor standards;
(7) Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers's proposal to Unocal to re-
port on operations in Burma; and
(8) The United Brotherhood of Carpenter and Joiners of America's
proposal to Chevron to report on worker health and safety policies.
See Checklist of 1997 Shareholder Resolutions, CORP. SOC. ISSUES REP. (Investor Resp.
Res. Center Soc. Issues Service, Washington, D.C.), May 1997, at 13-19.
8. See Telephone interview with Bart Naylor, International Brotherhood of Team-
ster (June 5, 1997); Telephone interview with Ed Durkin, United Brotherhood of Car-
penters and Joiners (June 26, 1997).
9. See Joann S. Lublin, Texaco Case Causes a Stir in Boardrooms, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 22, 1996, at B1.
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ration. ° Of course, corporate governance matters to workers,
especially for those employed by corporations with large invest-
ments in physical capital. For those companies (which tend to
be unionized), product markets may take longer to force change
in corporate policies. Thus, workers want boards to ensure that
managers are responding to early market signals in order to
avoid major layoffs that accompany long-term mismanage-
ment." But labor-shareholder activism prompts us to inquire
whether labor-shareholders can promote goals more directly
related to employment concerns.
Recognizing the significance of this question, AFL-CIO Secre-
tary-Treasurer Richard L. Trumka asserts: "there is no more
important strategy for the Labor Movement than harnessing
our pension funds and developing capital strategies so we can
stop our money from cutting our own throats." s In this article,
I assess opportunities to use labor's capital to facilitate a differ-
ent corporate governance balance of power-worker capital-
ism." Specifically, I explore the political and economic land-
10. For a political-economic analysis of corporate governance, see TERESA
GHILARDUCCI, LABOR'S CAPITAL: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS
(1992); MARK ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994); John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corpo-
rate Governance as A Multi-Player Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495 (1990); John Pound, The
Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1003 (1993).
11. See ROE, supra note 10, at viii.
12. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, INDUSTRIAL HEARTLAND LABOR INVEST-
MENT FORUM 2 (June 14-15, 1996) (conference pamphlet materials quoting AFL-CIO
Secretary-Treasurer Richard L. Trumka) (on file with author). In their article on
labor-shareholders, Stewart J. Schwab and Randall S. Thomas conclude:
Our analysis suggests that if unions are successful in mobilizing share-
holder support for their voting initiatives, they may be able to get boards
to consider labor's interests as part of their processes of considering
shareholder's interests without any dramatic changes in legal rules. If
this is correct, it gives labor another method of seeking to protect labor's
firm-specific investments and implicit contracts, as labor and other share-
holders press management to keep its word. Furthermore, it suggests
that labor qua shareholder should use its monitoring abilities to keep
itself and other shareholders advised about board actions that affect its
firm specific investments and, more generally, firm value.
Schwab & Thomas, supra note 2 (manuscript at 171). Joseph Blasi and Douglas
Kruse suggest: "[how private-sector unions deal with employee ownership will deter-
mine their continued existence in the next half century." JOSEPH BLASI & DOUGLAS
KRUSE, THE NEW OwNERS 231 (1994).
13. For alternative views of pension fund socialism, see William H. Simon, The
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scape of the institutional shareholder movement to analyze
whether labor-shareholders could ally with corporate governance
reformers and social activists to encourage managers to promote
high performance workplace practices.'4
In surveying the changing economic environment, we find
that former Labor Secretary Robert Reich made significant
efforts to educate institutional shareholders about the efficiency
benefits of high-performance workplace practices. This topic,
however, remains largely unexplored. But a consensus is emerg-
ing that the distinctive feature of the new economy is an in-
creasing emphasis on the knowledge of employees. Many com-
panies in the United States and abroad are moving beyond
traditional financial indicators and developing techniques to
measure workplace practices along with customer satisfaction,
supplier relations, and product quality. 5 Several prominent
corporate governance scholars suggest that shareholders are
entering a new stage of activism 6 which focuses on these new
performance measures to monitor firms' performance.' These
Prospects of Pension Fund Socialism, 14 BERKELEY J. Emp. & LAB. L. 251 (1993);
Teresa Ghilarducci et al., Labor's Paradoxical Interests and the Evolution of Corporate
Governance, 24 J.L. & SoCY 26 (1997).
14. Schwab and Thomas recognize that "[i]f labor wants to succeed in getting
these proposals adopted, it needs to find a way to document that they have value to
the firm and to demonstrate that to other shareholders." Schwab & Thomas, supra
note 2 (manuscript at 165).
15. For recent publications discussing intellectual capital, see LEIF EDVINSSON &
MICHAEL S. MALONE, INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: REALNG YOUR COMPANYS TRUE VAL-
UE BY FINDING ITS HIDDEN ROOTS (1997); ROBERT S. KAPLAN & DAVID NORTON, THE
BALANCED SCORECARD (1996); THOMAs A. STEWART, INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: THE NEW
WEALTH OF ORGANMATIONS (1997).
16. See CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE 87 (1997); MICHAEL USEEM1, INVESTOR CAPITALmI: How MONEY MANAGERS
ARE CHANGING THE FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA 277 (1996) (stating that "questions
may expand from whether the professional money managers are achieving maximum
private return to whether they are fostering maximum public good"); see also
Ghilarducci et al., supra note 13, at 26.
17. The Conference Board has devoted significant attention to workplace practices.
See BRANCATO, supra note 16, at 87. Other leading corporate governance organiza-
tions, such as the Council of Institutional Investors (CH) and the National Association
of Corporate Directors (NACD) have also shown interest in the new performance
measures. Jonathan Low of the Ernst & Young Center for Business Innovation pre-
sented a paper titled: "Measures that Matter" to these groups in 1997. In addition,
CII has founded a committee to study workplace programs under the direction of Ed
Durkin of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners. At this point, the
NACD does not have such a committee.
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commentators emphasize that patient investors are beginning to
evaluate aspects of labor relations not on social grounds, but as
indicators of companies' potential to innovate in an intensely
competitive environment.
This recent emphasis on workplace measures presents an
opportunity for labor-shareholders to build alliances among
public pension funds and social activists to concentrate on is-
sues such as worker training, labor turnover, and employee
empowerment. Along these lines, we find that labor-sharehold-
ers have begun to submit resolutions requesting information
about high-performance workplace practices."8 These proposals
enhance the long-range effort to establish a standardized meth-
od of reporting to publicize corporations' human-resource values.
In this regard, unions could play a critical role in developing
disclosure standards by identifying problems in performance
measures and providing a clearinghouse for information about
workplace practices."9
In evaluating the political climate, we find that executive
compensation and stock prices increase while wages are stag-
nant and corporations downsize their workforces. More impor-
tantly, media reports suggest that pension funds are "cannibal-
istically" driving the downsizing phenomenon."0 Labor-share-
holder activism has significant symbolic value because it high-
lights the fact that working people are the beneficiaries of
many institutional shareholders. Labor-shareholder activism has
increased just when leaders in the corporate world are con-
cerned that corporations are facing a legitimacy crisis. Stephen
Roach, chief economist of Morgan Stanley, recently reversed his
long-standing position promoting the economic benefits of down-
18. See infra text accompanying notes 106-15.
19. Schwab and Thomas note: "lwihile union-shareholder activism could have long-
lasting effects on the union's role in corporate governance, unions need to focus their
shareholder voting initiatives in areas where they have special expertise in monitor-
ing management to garner other shareholders' support for their platform." Schwab &
Thomas, supra note 2 (manuscript at 138); see also BLASI & KRUSE, supra note 12, at
176.
20. See Robyn Meredith, Executive Defends Downsizing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1996,
at D4 ("[Sitanding behind those institutional investors are American workers who
have sunk their retirement savings into mutual stock funds and are fighting to be
sure they get the best returns possible. Those are some of the same workers who in
turn have been laid off as their employers struggle to please investors.").
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sizing because he fears that the economic disparities will cul-
minate in a "worker backlash."2 Echoing this apprehension,
Harvard Business School professors Rosabeth Moss Kanter'
and Michael Jensen warn of the possible backlash against
capitalism's creative destruction. Viewed in this light, the dem-
ocratic process governing shareholder debate is important be-
cause it serves as an outlet for employees' growing frustrations
with corporate America.
The increasing uneasiness over worker backlash against the
corporation presents an opportunity for labor-shareholders to
increase political pressure on pension funds to support employ-
ment-related shareholder proposals. Along these lines, the AFL-
CIO has started to use the Internet to promote a grass roots
political movement to encourage pension fund beneficiaries to
communicate to trustees about growing wage inequality and
excessive executive compensation.' These efforts enhance the
long-range goal of educating beneficiaries about the nature of
pension funds and the tremendous power these funds have over
American corporate governance. In this regard, unions could
play a critical role in mobilizing labor's capital to reflect
workers' interests in corporate governance.
In these ways, labor-shareholders capitalize on the synergy
between economic forces promoting new performance measures
and political pressures mounting over worker hardship caused
by economic transition. These capital strategies are the most
feasible alternatives for the labor movement in the current
political atmosphere that stresses the need for "labor market
flexibility." Labor-shareholder activism, however, does not re-
quire changes in corporate governance structures or institutions
regulating the relationship between labor and capital. In fact,
employee ownership receives much bi-partisan political support
21. See The Economy Perspective: Roach Rethinks Wall Street, INVESTOR'S Bus.
DAILY, May 22, 1996, at B1.
22. See Sid Saniad, Editorial, The Right Best Watch That Its Conservative Wind
Not Blow Back On It, VANCOUVER SUN, June 7, 1996, at A23. Harvard business pro-
fessor Rosabeth Moss Kanter warns "we may be entering an era of tremendous back-
lash against capitalism." Id.
23. See Michael C. Jensen & Perry Fagan, The Third Industrial Revolution, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 29, 1996, at A10 (noting that dislocations of globalized growth may cause
"the failure of one or more Western democracies").
24. See infra text accompanying notes 36-37.
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because it is consistent with the shareholder sovereignty princi-
ple of American capitalism. Specifically, labor-shareholder activ-
ism accords with long-standing traditions allowing shareholders
to raise public policy questions in the corporate forum. To maxi-
mize the economic-political leverage of labor's capital to promote
worker capitalism, labor-shareholders need to maneuver around
both the legal regulations that govern shareholder proposals as
well as the more complex obstacles involved in garnering share-
holder support for their resolutions.
Part I of this article reviews how recent Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) policy concerning Rule 14a-8,'
the shareholder proposal rule, hinders efforts of the Department
of Labor (DOL) to encourage institutional shareholders to pro-
mote high performance workplace practices. In 1992, the SEC
decided it was no longer able to decide which employment mat-
ters are appropriate for shareholders to consider. As a result,
the SEC allows managers to exclude employment-related pro-
posals under the ordinary business exception of Rule 14a-8. As
this goes to press, it appears highly likely that the Cracker
Barrel policy will be reversed," raising questions about which
employment-related shareholder proposals pose significant
public policy issues. These areas would include key employ-
ment-related concerns including downsizing, worker retraining,
and empowerment.
Part II emphasizes that these legal issues, while important,
are insignificant compared to political and economic factors that
labor-shareholders must navigate in order to encourage other
shareholders to favor high-performance workplace practices. In
analyzing the political economy of labor's capital, I emphasize
that opinion leaders are very influential in the institutional
shareholder circle. I also highlight the role played by both the
financial and popular press in their daily reporting about share-
holder activists' efforts to increase corporate accountability. This
heightened visibility ensures that moral restraints have some
force in shaping the norms governing the shareholder activists'
25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1997).
26. See Carolyn Mathiasen, SEC Rules EEO Resolutions Are Still Excludable,
CoRP. Soc. IssuEs REP. (Investors Resp. Res. Center Soc. Issues Service, Wash.,
D.C.), Feb. 1998, at 1.
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agenda. Political constraints can only go so far. Global market
forces severely limit labor-shareholders ability to protect em-
ployee interests both here and abroad.
In Part III, I concentrate on how the knowledge-based econo-
my requires better evaluation of human-resource practices in
strategic corporate decision making. 7  Specifically, recent
trends in measuring human resources could lead to disclosure
practices that provide meaning to the statement "employees are
our most valuable asset." My goal is to facilitate efforts to de-
vise a common language concerning workplace practices that
improve the dialogue between and among employees, managers,
directors, and long-term investors. Specifically, under the theory
that "you manage what you measure,"' new rules concerning
corporate financial disclosure of human-resource practices could
lead to a change in corporate and societal perceptions of the
nature of the employment relationship. I conclude that we have
much to learn about the co-evolution of corporate governance
structures, securities regulations, and workplace practices.' I
27. I leave grass roots political strategizing to others. Joel Rogers has formed the
"New Party" to address labor concerns. See generally Joel Rogers, Why America Needs
a New Party, 18 BOST. REV. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1993) <http//www.polisci.mit.
edulbostonreview/BR18.1/revive.html>.
28. Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You
Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUA. L. REv. 1335, 1344 (1996).
29. In this regard, Robert G. Eccles notes:
Open-mindedness about the structures and processes that will be most
effective, now and in the future, is equally important. I know of a few
companies that are experimenting with combining the information sys-
tems and human-resource departments. These experiments have entailed
a certain amount of culture shock for professionals from both functions,
but such radical rethinking is what revolution is all about.
Robert G. Eccles, The Performance Measurement Manifesto, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-
Feb. 1991, at 131, 137.
In entering this mutual dialogue, we need to reconsider the language that we
use to talk about employees because rhetoric matters. I have emphasized that we
should discuss fiduciary obligations in terms of morality, because efficiency rhetoric
dilutes its fundamental socialization role. See generally Marleen A. O'Connor, How
Should We Talk About Fiduciary Duty?, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 954 (1993). In a re-
cent book review of PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed. 1995),
Carl Landauer criticized my use of efficiency language to discuss ways to protect
workers' implicit employment agreements. See Carl Landauer, Beyond the Law and
Economics Style: Advancing Corporate Law in an Era of Downsizing and Corporate
Reengineering, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1693, 1694 (1996) (book review).
Nevertheless, given the current economic climate, we must consider questions of
efficiency in discussing employment matters. See Karl E. Mare, Workplace Democracy
19971 1353
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urge accountants and securities lawyers to join forces with
labor leaders and industrial relations experts to quantify as-
pects of human capital that financial measures do not capture.
II. LABOR'S CAPITAL: PENSION POWER AND HUMAN-RESOURCE
VALUES IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY
A. Pension Fund Capitalism
Labor's pension assets are the United States' largest source
of capital, amounting to thirty-five percent of equity holdings."
Scholars predict that by the year 2000, employees will own at
least twenty-five percent of publicly-held companies.31 More
than twenty years ago, Peter Drucker reported the significance
of this trend. In his book, The Unseen Revolution, Drucker
described the rise of labor's capital as "pension fund social-
ism." 2 Many scholars criticize his terminology because "social-
ism" implies control. As beneficiaries of pension funds, workers
do not participate in corporate governance by electing directors
and voting proxies. Rather, pension fund fiduciaries retain
and Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 7
(1988) (stating "[elfficiency is simply too important a matter to be left to manage-
ment."); Karl E. Mare, The Labor-Management Cooperation Debate: A Workplace De-
mocracy Perspective, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 39 (1988) (arguing that concerns
about equity and self-realization cannot eliminate attention to efficiency).
My aim in this article is to talk about better management and disclosure con-
cerning the firm's employees as a resource, rather than thinking about the idea of
putting workers on the balance sheet. We do not want to view employees themselves
as assets, but rather try to rethink the firm's investments in workers.
Mark Roe has developed an approach that considers the political economy of
how corporate governance systems develop. See generally ROE, supra note 10. Ronald
Gilson has remarked that this approach combines insights from economics as well as
critical legal studies. See Ronald J. Gilson, Comment, in THE DEAL DECADE: WHAT
TAKEOVERS AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS MEAN FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RATE 357
(Margaret Blair ed., 1993). For use of this approach to examine issues concerning the
employees' role in corporate governance, see Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Life-
time Employment: Labor Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance
(Oct. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
30. See 1 THE BRANCATO REPORT ON INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT: FINANCIAL AS-
SETS AND EQUITY HOLDINGS 47 (1996).
31. See BLASI & KRUSE, supra note 12, at 230; COREY ROSEN & KAREN YOUNG,
UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP (1991).
32. See PETER DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION 27 (1976). Peter Drucker ar-
gues that "[i]f 'socialism' is defined as 'ownership of the means of production by the
workers' and this is both the orthodox and the only rigorous definition-then the
United States is the first truly 'socialist' country." Id.
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these rights, which constitute a vast amount of power over
American corporate governance. Commentators contend that
what has developed is not pension fund socialism, but pension
fund capitalism. Drucker accepts this recharacterization: "Pen-
sion fund capitalism is fundamentally as different from any
earlier form of capitalism as it is from anything any socialist
ever envisaged as a socialist economy."33
A large gap exists, however, between the amount of employ-
ee-ownership and the prevailing ideology concerning workers'
control of their capital.' Labor-shareholder activists William
Patterson and Bart Naylor explain: "There's an expectation in
corporate America that employee-shareholders are to be seen
and not heard. But we're seeing among some employee-share-
holders an awareness of who really owns the company.""m Spe-
cifically, four recent efforts by labor-shareholders in asserting
their corporate governance rights suggest potential for the fu-
ture of worker capitalism, as labor-shareholders reprimand
executives for over-compensation, under-performance, and anti-
takeover protection.
First, the AFL-CIO launched a web-site, "Executive
PayWatch,"8 to allow employees and investors to monitor the
compensation packages of corporate chief executive officers.37
This on-line service is a grass roots political effort to encourage
workers to express their views about the expanding wage in-
equality in the United States to their pension fund managers.
33. Id. at 143. Drucker also emphasized that the distinctive feature of the
emerging economy is an increasing emphasis on what he refers to as the "knowledge
worker." See id. As early as 1976, Drucker noted the connection between the two
shifts in the economy involving pension fund capitalism and knowledge workers; "[tIhe
more the center of gravity in the labor force shifts from blue-collar worker to knowl-
edge workers, the riskier it will be to ignore the emergence of pension fund social-
ism." Id.
34. See BLASI & KRUSE, supra note 12, at 230.
35. Employee Ownership Letter from William Patterson and Bartlett Naylor, of
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, to the Securities and Exchange Conmis-
sion 5 (Nov. 16, 1995) (on file with author).
36. AFL-CIO, Executive PayWatch (visited March 11, 1998) <http-//aflcio.paywatch.
org/ceopay/front.html>.
37. Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO Richard Trumka states: "At a time when
America desperately needs a raise, it is devastating to workers' morale to realize that
they would have to work thousands of years to earn what their CEOs take home
every year." AFL-CIO Unveils New Web Site to Track Executive Compensation, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 79, at 2 (Apr. 11, 1997).
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Second, the Teamsters issued a list of America's "Least Valu-
able Directors" for the past two years.8 This list is an impor-
tant step in shareholder activist efforts to publicly censure
directors who are overcommitted, without time to seriously
consider their board duties.
Third, the Teamsters prevailed in litigation against the direc-
tors of Fleming Corporation to amend a bylaw to prevent the
board from issuing a poison pill without shareholder consent.39
This court decision credits the labor movement with significant-
ly changing the power dynamics of corporate governance in fa-
vor of shareholders. Finally, the AFL-CIO has launched a new
"Center for Working Capital" designed to coordinate labor pen-
sion funds to protect labor's interests.4 °
Thus, although the tools under labor law are ineffective
against managers intent on avoiding unions, the tables are
turned as labor-shareholders use their corporate governance
rights to make managers more accountable. Indeed, Joseph
Blasi and Douglas Kruse suggest that corporate governance
rights will trump labor laws in importance and that sharehold-
er rights may constitute a new focal point for future labor rela-
tions.4
At this point, we must consider the legal restraints that arise
in seeking to facilitate employment-related goals through labor's
pension power. I first review the fiduciary duty limitations on
pension fimd managers before turning to the securities law
restrictions on employment-related shareholder proposals.
B. Reich's Efforts to Promote High-Performance Workplaces
Labor Secretary Robert Reich promoted the economic value of
high-performance workplace practices for the future competitive-
ness of American companies.42 Reich maintained that corporate
38. See Judith Dobrzynski, Unions Brandish Shares, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996,
at 17.
39. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 2 (manuscript at 112).
40. Aaron Bernstein, 'Working Capital'. Labor's New Weapon?, Bus. WK., Sept. 29,
1997, at 110.
41. See BLASI & KRUSE, supra note 12, at 235.
42. See generally U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, ROAD TO HIGH-PERFORMANCE WORKPLACE:
A GUIDE TO BETTER JOBS AND BETTER BUSINESS RESULTS (1994).
1356
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performance depends on how firms treat the "nation's most.
important competitive asset, . . . the skill and learning of its
workforce.' Under his direction, in 1994 the DOL issued a
report on high-performance workplace practices which empha-
sized employee involvement in management decisions, team pro-
duction methods, advanced training programs, and the integra-
tion of human-resource policies in business strategies."
Recognizing the power of institutional investors, Reich pushed
the DOL to take two steps to encourage high-performance
workplace practices through corporate governance institu-
tions.45 First, the DOL clarified ERISA guidelines covering
private pension fund managers' fiduciary obligations in voting
proxies. Second, the DOL made efforts to facilitate corporate
financial disclosure of human-resource values.
1. Pension Fund Managers' Fiduciary Restraints
The first step the DOL took to prompt institutional investors
to favor high-performance workplace practices was to specify
the fiduciary duties under ERISA of pension fund managers.
ERISA applies to both corporate pension funds and industry-
wide (Taft-Hartley47) labor pension funds which are jointly
trusteed by management and labor. Common law rules govern
the fiduciary obligations of public pension funds and generally
take similar positions on "prudent person" standards of fidu-
ciary conduct. The primary concern of these fiduciary rules is to
restrict the risk pension funds carry in order to safeguard re-
tirement income. Nevertheless, pension fund managers can
pursue a wide range of actions to foster high-performance
workplace practices.
In 1994, the DOL issued investment guidelines for private
pension fiduciaries,4 emphasizing that ERISA's purpose is to
43. Beverly Geber, Preaching the Gospel: Concept of High-Performance Organiza-
tion Being Promoted by Office of American Workplace, TRAINING, Feb. 1, 1995, at 47.
44. See id.
45. For further discussion, see Jayne Zanglein, Pensions, Proxies and Power, 7
LAB. LAW. 771 (1991).
46. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1994).
47. See Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1994).
48. See Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration Interpretive Bulletin 94-2,
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protect the retirement benefits of employees and that the main
role of the trustee is to maximize the beneficiaries' holdings.
The DOL encouraged fund managers to take a more active role
in corporate governance matters by critically reviewing issues in
voting proxies on traditional corporate governance matters such
as executive compensation and board independence. The DOL
reinforced its position that fund managers should not attempt
to secure beneficiaries' jobs or raise their wages.49 Importantly,
however, the DOL announced that pension fund managers may
promote a company's "investment in training to develop its
workforce, other workplace practices and financial and non-
financial measures of corporate performance." °
2. Corporate Financial Disclosure of Human-Resource Values
The second step that the DOL took to encourage investors to
consider workplace practices was to push for corporate financial
disclosure of human-resource values. Reich emphasized that the
balance sheet does not capture the quality and loyalty of the
company's work force, the level of investment in training and
retraining, or the capacity of the employees to continually inno-
vate and adapt. Under Reich's direction, the DOL formed a task
force to research the possibility of altering existing accounting
rules to allow companies to capitalize training expenditures as
assets rather than expensing the investments in the current
period.
During the hearings on the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995, Reich testified before the SEC about the need
to expand the safe harbor provision for forward-looking
29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (1997) [hereinafter Bulletin 94-2]; see also Labor Department
Moves to Increase Shareholder Activism by Pension Plans, [July-Dec.] Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1057 (July 29, 1994); Patricia Limbacher, DOL Peeking Over
Proxy Shoulders, PENSIONS & INVESTMENS, Mar. 6, 1995, at 1; Patrick McGurn, DOL
Issues New Guidelines on Proxy Voting, Active Investing, CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL.
(Investor Resp. Res. Center Corp. Governance and Shareholder Services, Wash. D.C.),
July-Aug. 1994, at 1.
49. The Department stated that pension fiduciaries should consider matters that
will increase plan assets and "not subordinate the interests of the participants and
beneficiaries in their retirement income to unrelated objectives." Bulletin 94-2, supra
note 48.
50. Id.
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statements to protect corporate disclosures of workplace practic-
es.51 Reich asserted that publicly traded companies have been
reluctant to share information about employment matters with
investors for fear of litigation. Acknowledging the DOL's con-
cerns, the SEC noted that the investment community has an
interest in disclosure of performance measures that go beyond
the traditional financial indicators,52 such as those involving
"workforce training and development."53
The DOL's attempts to encourage institutional investors to
evaluate workplace practices have had little effect. The pension
fiduciary guidelines, while doctrinally sound, do not address the
conflicts of interest inherent in management's domination of
private pension funds. In addition, many public pension fund
managers view employment issues as social, rather than eco-,
nomic concerns. Part II addresses in detail these institutional
and political constraints. At this point, I consider the extent to
which institutional investors evaluate workplace practices in
making investment decisions.
C. Institutional Investor Analysis of Workplace Practices
One of the largest institutional investors, California Public
Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS), has taken four steps
to promote high-performance workplaces. First, in 1994,
CalPERS announced that it would consider aspects of labor
relations in its investment analysis.' CalPERS analyzes the
availability of employee training programs and the degree of
responsibility given to lower-level workers. Second, in the same
year, CalPERS worked with trade unions to formulate restric-
tions that prevent CalPERS from investing in construction
51. See Carolyn Kay Brancato, New Corporate Performance Measures, CONFERENCE
BOARD, 1995, at 58 (referring to Robert B. Reich, Statement of the Secretary of Labor
Before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Hearing on Safe Harbor Protection
for Corporate Disclosure of High-Performance Work Practices, Feb. 13, 1994, pp. 3-5).
52. See Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Exchange Act Release No.
33-7101, 59 Fed. Reg. 52723, at 52726 (Oct. 19, 1994).
53. I&
54. See BRANCATO, supra note 16, at 125; see also Asra Nomani, CaIPERS Says
Its Investment Decisions Will Reflect How Firms Treat Workers, WALL ST. J., June 16,
1994, at AS.
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projects that do not meet specific labor standards.55 Third, in
1996 Richard Koppes of CalPERS published a widely publicized
editorial criticizing firms that layoff employees to raise short-
term stock prices.56 Finally, on Labor Day in 1997, CalPERS
launched a "reverse Robin Hood" program that targets firms
that downsize while paying excessive executive compensation."
CalPERS justifies its concern over workplace issues as means
to measure firms' long-term economic performance. Specifically,
CalPERS bases its decision on research suggesting that human-
resource policies improve corporate performance." As leaders
in the institutional shareholders' movement, CalPERS' pro-
grams signal the need to rely on nontraditional measures to
evaluate human-resource values.
In contrast to CalPERS' approach, certain pension funds
provide separate accounts to select investments using social
performance criteria. For example, in 1993 the Teachers' Insur-
ance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities
Fund (TIAA-CREF)59 adopted a Social Choice program that
screens for workplace practices including: strong union rela-
tions, widespread employee training, cash-profit sharing, em-
ployee involvement in decisionmaking, and generous retirement
benefits.' Social funds also consider whether and how firms
implement decisions to downsize their workforces. For example,
Domini Social Investments analyzes whether companies have
reduced their workforces by fifteen percent in the most recent
year or by twenty-five percent during the past two years.6
These social funds evaluate employment information concerning
labor turnover, job retraining, and worker empowerment. Addi-
tionally, social funds have guidelines for global labor-practices
55. See Ghilarducci et al., supra note 13, at 38.
56. See Richard Koppes, And in the Long Run We Should Win, N.Y. TIMES, May
19, 1996, § 3, at 13. "But contrary to assumptions being made in some board rooms
of the United States, CalPERS . . . is not pushing to bump up short-term stock pric-
es .... CalPERS doesn't condone what's going on. We wont participate in that kind
of greed.". Id.
57. CalPERS Approves 1997 Corporate Governance Program, Bus. WIRE, Sept. 18,
1996, at 5.
58. See BRANCATO, supra note 16, at 126.
59. See id. at 125-26 (citing TIAA-CREF policy statement).
60. See id.
61. See generally PETER D. KINDER ET AL., INVESTING FOR GOOD 157-78 (1994).
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which focus on preventing forced labor and child labor and
protecting workers' rights to unionize. Often these social funds
base global screens on codes of conduct promulgated by the
International Labor Organization. 2
D. SEC Policy Concerning Employment-Related Shareholder
Proposals
1. Social Responsibility Proposals and Rule 14a-8(c)(7)
In evaluating the legal restrictions on harnessing labor's
pension power to promote high-performance workplaces, this
article turns to the SEC's policies concerning employment-re-
lated shareholder proposals. Rule 14a-8 requires managers to
include shareholder proposals in a corporation's proxy statement
and to schedule a vote on the matter at the annual
shareholders' meeting.' In the past, the Commission took the
position that companies had to include in their proxy state-
ments shareholder resolutions related to significant social policy
issues implicated by a company's business operations. Since
Campaign GM, social advocacy groups have used Rule 14a-8 to
raise concerns about corporate policies involving such topics as
nuclear power, the environment, and affirmative action." To
facilitate debate about legal reform, these groups tend to target
high visibility companies so as to draw national attention to
issues. Managers view these social proposals as involving emo-
tional issues, brought by "gadflies" and "crazies" seeking public-
ity for quixotic causes.65 In response to such criticisms, social
activists point out that despite the low number of votes their
proposals receive, in many instances their proxy contests
62. See Principles for Global Corporate Responsibility, Interfaith Center on Cor-
porate Responsibility, THE CoRP. EXAMINER, Sept. 1, 1995, at 9.
63. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (1997).
64. See Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflection on Cam-
paign GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 419, 423, 517-20 (1971); Donald E. Schwartz, Towards
New Corporate Goals: Co-Existence with Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 57 (1971). For criticism
of social policy shareholder resolutions, see Henry G. Manne, Shareholder Social Pro-
posals Viewed by an Opponent, 24 STAN. L. REV. 481 (1972).
65. In one case, a CEO severely criticized a prominent religious leader for her
efforts to promote diversity throughout corporations. See Ellen Joan Pollock, Angry
Mail: CEO Takes On a Nun In a Crusade Against 'Political Correctness," WALL ST.
J., July 15, 1996, at Al.
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prompt executives to change corporate practices. For example,
General Motors recently reacted to shareholder criticism of low
wages paid to employees in Mexico by building homes for those
workers." Managers respond to social activists' requests as a
means to diffuse political pressures that often lead to increased
regulation. 7
Generally, the SEC allows managers to exclude proposals
regarding day-to-day employment matters from a company's
proxy materials as relating to ordinary business under Rule
14a-8(c)(7).' The SEC routinely permits managers to omit la-
bor-shareholder proposals that seek to pressure managers at
the collective bargaining table. Such proposals include those
recommending that the company (1) reach a good faith agree-
ment in collective bargaining with its union, 9 (2) work with
unions to foster cooperative relationships, or (3) permit em-
ployees to retire after thirty years of service with full pension
benefits. 1
As public opinion evolved and issues received national atten-
tion, the SEC's position changed to allow shareholders to raise
certain employment issues as significant social policy matters.
For example, the SEC allowed shareholder proposals to raise
questions concerning equal employment and affIrmative action.
The SEC, however, reversed this policy in the Cracker Barrel
decision.
66. See Lynn Graebner, 'Social Investing' Grows in Strength, BUS. J., Jan. 6,
1997, at 1.
67. In this regard, David Vogel remarks: "[tIhe extent to which [social activists']
demands addressed to the corporation anticipate the substance of subsequent govern.
ment regulations of business is indeed striking." DAVID VOGEL, LOBBYING THE CORPO-
RATION 14 (1978).
68. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(7) (1997).
69. See Capital Cities Comm., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 30934, at *3
(March 16, 1983), reconsidered 1983 WL 31039 (Mar. 24, 1983); General Motors Corp,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 WL 12352, at *5 (Feb. 27, 1978).
70. See Gannett Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 53957, at *3 (Mar. 11,
1985).
71. See Louisiana-Pacific, SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 45804, at *13 (Mar. 6,
1984) (discussing general contract negotiation efforts).
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2. The Cracker Barrel Controversy
In recent years, controversy has surrounded the shareholder
proposal rule because of the 1992 SEC decision that Cracker
Barrel Old Country Stores could exclude a proposal recommend-
ing that the company change its hiring practices which discrim-
inated against homosexuals.72 Importantly, in Cracker Barrel,
the SEC reversed a long-standing policy concerning employment
issues that raise social issues." The SEC explained that "the
line between includable and excludable employment-related
proposals based on social policy considerations has become in-
creasingly difficult to draw."74 For this reason, the SEC stated
it would no longer remove a shareholder proposal focusing on a
company's employment practices for the general workforce that
raises social policy questions by reason of the ordinary business
exclusion.
The SEC's Cracker Barrel decision forces proponents of em-
ployment-related proposals to sue for inclusion, even though the
proposals raise significant policy considerations. The SEC has
refused to reconsider its position because it is reevaluating the
entire process of submitting shareholder proposals under Rule
14a-8.75 Prompted in part by the Cracker Barrel controversy,
Congress directed the SEC to study the need to amend Rule
14a-8.76 Not surprisingly, managers from major corporations
72. See Cracker Barrel Old Country Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL
289095, at *18-19 (Oct. 13, 1992).
73. See id. The proponent of the proposal challenged the SEC decision in Cracker
Barrel in federal court. The district court issued an injunction against the Commis-
sion that prohibited the issuance of any ruling at variance with the courts construc-
tion of the 1976 Interpretive Release unless and until the Commission amended Rule
14a-8(c)(7) in a rule-making proceeding in accordance with the requirements of the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA). See New York City Employees Retirement Sys.
v. SEC, 843 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the
district court, holding inapplicable the notice and comment requirements of the APA
and determining that the plaintiffs had an effective alternative to suing the
SEC-they could sue to enjoin the company to include their proposal in its proxy
materials. See New York City Employees Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir.
1995).
74. Cracker Barrel Old Country Stores, Inc., supra note 72, at *18.
75. See AlliedSignal, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 34875, at *2 (Jan. 23,
1997).
76. See Wallman Proposes Broad Changes to SEC's Shareholder Proposal Rule,
Sec. L. Daily, (BNA) at D-4, (Oct. 9, 1996). In addition, Wallman suggests that the
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have sought to maintain the Cracker Barrel policy,7 7 while un-
ions and social activists support its reversal. At this time, it
appears likely that the SEC will reverse the Cracker Barrel
policy.78
Why did the SEC decide to exclude employment-related
shareholder proposals in Cracker Barrel? Overall, people in the
institutional shareholder movement sympathize with the SEC's
difficulty in drawing lines between social policy and ordinary
business matters. A few, however, suggest that this does not
fully explain why the staff should consequently exclude all
employment-related proposals, even those that involve signifi-
cant policy considerations.79 These critics emphasize that the
SEC staffs expansive reading of its policy against employment-
related shareholder resolutions came at a time when proponents
are focusing more attention on labor issues. Indeed, the staff
excludes thirty percent more social proposals than it did ten
years ago. 0 Labor unions, church groups, and the New York
City pension funds are concerned about the shift in the SEC's
position away from social policy issues. The Investor Research
Responsibility Center (IRRC) maintains:
[S]ome of the Commissioners had been "very troubled" by
complaints from corporate secretaries. According to some
sources, Chairman Richard Breedon held a particularly
strong view on this issue. Breedon and others may have
SEC automatically allow "core" or traditional corporate governance proposals on the
proxy statement. See id. at D-5. Shareholders could submit "other," or social policy
concerns on a lottery basis, but managers could not submit a proposal if at least
three percent of the shareholders supported it. See id. at D-6. The only subjective
decision left for SEC staff would be to decide whether a proposal is frivolous. See id.
at D-7.
77. See SEC Survey Shows Cracker Barrel Still Controversial; Some Responding
Issuers Seek Tougher Access Threshold, Corp. Couns. Wkly. (BNA), at 8 (Apr. 30,
1997) (stating that ten corporations advocated maintaining the Cracker Barrel posi-
tion).
78. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
34-39093, Sept. 18, 1997, at *1, available in 1997 WL 578696.
79. Several people support this public choice story. See Telephone Interview with
Pat Doherty, NYCERS (June 13, 1997); Telephone Interview with Paul Neuhauser,
attorney for religious investors (Mar. 11, 1997); Telephone Interview with Bart
Naylor, United Bhd. of Teamsters, (Feb. 27, 1997).
80. See The Controversy Over Employment-Related Shareholder Resolutions: A
Recap, CORP. Soc. ISSUES REP. (Investor Resp. Res. Center Soc. Issues Service,
Wash., D.C.), Feb. 1996, at 5.
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been bothered in part because labor unions were beginning
to raise the equal employment issue. In addition, the Com-
mission was moving toward a decision, announced in Febru-
ary 1992, that executive compensation issues would no
longer be classed as ordinary business; Commissioners may
have been anxious to provide corporations with a bit of a
quid pro quo on shareholder resolutions."'
If true, this public choice story significantly tarnishes the SEC's
long-standing reputation for not being captured by the firms it
regulates. Most people, however, accept the SEC's statement in
Cracker Barrel on its face and do not agree that the SEC's
decision was designed to insulate managers from social activ-
ists.
Rejecting IRRC's public choice theory, labor leader Ed Durkin
points to the SEC's recent interpretation of Rule 14a-8(c)(4),82
which allows managers to exclude proposals submitted by
shareholders who seek "to redress a personal claim or griev-
ance." The SEC designed this exclusion to prevent sharehold-
ers from using proposals to harass issuers into giving the pro-
ponent some particular benefit not available to other sharehold-
ers. In deciding whether to exclude a proposal, the SEC can
look beyond the substance of a resolution that is relevant to the
entire shareholder body if the facts and circumstances indicate
that the proponent had an "improper motive." A recent SEC
interpretation of this rule favors unions by placing a heavy
burden of proof on companies to substantiate improper motive
charges.' In response, IRRC editor Ken Bertsch maintains
that the SEC's (c)(4) position is merely consistent with the
desire to avoid subjective line draving.85
While the public choice story remains unclear, former Com-
missioner Wallman's criticism that Cracker Barrel diminishes
81. Id.
82. 17 C.FJL § 240.14a-8(c)(4) (1997).
83. See Telephone Interview with Ed Durkin, United Bhd. of Carpenters and
Joiners (June 17, 1997).
84. See Patrick McGurn, SEC Holds Key to Labor Union Shareholder Proposals,
CoRP. GOVERNANCE BULL. (Investor Resp. Res. Center Corp. Governance and Share-
holder Services, Wash., D.C.), Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 9.
85. See Telephone Interview with Ken Bertsch, Editor, Investor Responsibility
Research Center (June 23, 1997).
1997] 1365
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1345
the SEC's credibility seems fair." Wallman maintains it is dif-
ficult to view resolutions relating to high profile policy matters
such as discrimination as "ordinary business" in light of recent
experiences at Texaco.87 Recognizing that Cracker Barrel is too
broad, the SEC recently made exceptions for shareholder pro-
posals concerning slave labor and child labor.8"
3. Employment-Related Shareholder Proposals After Cracker
Barrel
Despite Cracker Barrel, the number of employment-related
shareholder proposals has risen dramatically in the last few
years. In 1997, shareholders submitted eighty-two employment-
related shareholder resolutions focusing on global labor stan-
dards, Mexican maquiladora operations, and equal employment
in the United States and Northern Ireland. " Most of these
proposals were either withdrawn following agreements with
companies or included in proxy statements by companies seek-
ing to avoid both litigation and negative publicity resulting
from omitting employment-related resolutions.' Although the
Cracker Barrel policy impedes employment-related shareholder
proposals, proponents use innovative methods to indirectly raise
these issues by (1) linking these issues to executive compensa-
tion proposals and (2) discussing workplace matters in the sup-
porting statement to traditional corporate governance proposals.
86. See SEC Commissioners Duck Cracker Barrel Review, CORP. SOC. ISSUES REP.
(Investor Resp. Res. Center Soc. Issues Service, Wash. D.C.), Feb. 1997, at 1.
87. See Tracy Corrigan, Breaching Race, Gender Barriers: The Spectre of Bad Pub-
lieity, Boycotts and Falling Share Prices Has Made Workforce Diversity a Matter of
Serious Business, FIN. POST, Feb. 6, 1997, at 69.
88. See Dillard's Dep't Store, SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 112343, at *15
(Mar. 13, 1997).
89. IRRC reports the following voting results for employment-related proposals: in
1996, shareholders submitted 26 proposals; shareholders voted on five of these resolu-
tions, giving an average of eight percent of the votes. See Checklist of 1997 Share-
holder Resolutions, CORP. Soc. ISSUES REP. (Investors Resp. Res. Center Soc. Issues
Service, Wash., D.C.), June-July 1997, at 17-24. In 1995, 14 proposals were submit-
ted; five were voted on receiving an average of 11.9% of the votes. See Checklist of
1996 Shareholder Resolutions, CORP. Soc. ISSUES REP, (Investors Resp. Res. Center
Soc. Issues Service, Wash., D.C.), June 1996, at 19-24.
90. In 1996, 22 of these resolutions were proposed, and 19 were included by reg-
istrants in their proxy material. See Checklist of 1996 Shareholder Resolutions, CORP.
Soc. ISSUES REP. (Investors Resp. Res. Center Soc. Issues Service, Wash., D.C.), Mar.
1996, at 23-28.
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a. Linking Employment-Related Proposals to Executive
Compensation
Current SEC policy concerning Rule 14a-8 allows sharehold-
ers to address concerns about director and executive compensa-
tion, but not about workplace issues for rank and file employ-
ees. In two no-action rulings issued on the same day in 1996,
the SEC allowed a company to omit a proposal requesting a
report on high-performance workplace practices,91 but permit-
ted shareholders to submit a resolution urging the corporation
to link executive compensation to these practices.92 The SEC
staff explained that managers should include the second propos-
al because employment-related resolutions may raise "substan-
tial policy or other considerations" by drawing links to executive
compensation.93
A review of the 1997 proxy season reveals that labor-share-
holders filed three employment-related resolutions by linking
their proposals to executive compensation policies. First, the
Teamsters fied a proposal with Mobil urging the board to pro-
hibit executives from exercising stock options within six months
of the announcement of significant downsizing, defined as more
than one percent of the total work force. In its supporting
statement, the union called for assurance "that options reward
real improvements in performance, rather than short-term stock
boosts which are sometimes associated with the announcements
of major layoffs.' Second, the Communication Workers of
America filed a proposal at Sprint recommending that execu-
tives not receive a percentage increase in compensation greater
than that given to the average Sprint employee. In its support-
ing statement, the union asserted: "The Census Report showed
record levels of inequality, with the top fifth of American house-
holds earning 48.2% of this nation's income, while the bottom
fifth earned just 3.6%. This shareholder proposal is a modest
91. See W-R. Grace & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 434772, at *11 (Feb.
29, 1996).
92. See Louisiana-Pacific Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 86172, at *11
(Feb. 29, 1996).
93. See id.
94. MOBIL CORP., 1997 ANNUAL PROXY STATEMENT 16 (1997).
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attempt to address this unfortunate trend.""5 Finally, Unite
filed a proposal with May Department Stores recommending
that the board link executive compensation to overseas labor
standards." In the supporting statement, the union stated: "In
February 1996, clothes sold at May stores were identified by
the government as having been produced by Thai workers at an
El Monte, California sweatshop where these workers were held
captive under the threat of rape or murder and paid as little as
fifty cents per hour."97 These proposals are examples of the
sharp increase in the number of resolutions linking executive
compensation to social issues and other nonfinancial perfor-
mance measures filed in 1997.98
b. Discussing Labor Practices in Supporting Statements
For the most part, labor-shareholders' resolutions regarding
poison pills, executive compensation, and independent directors
do not differ from other shareholders' filings on these issues."
Labor-shareholders presumably resist criticizing management
for its employment practices to avoid Rule 14a-(8)(c)(8) charges
of improper motive. Occasionally, however, labor-shareholders
include language regarding employment issues in the support-
ing statements to proposals raising standard corporate gover-
nance matters. Questions arise concerning how far labor-share-
holders can take this strategy.
The SEC has imposed restrictions under Rule 14a-8(c)(3), 100
which prohibits "false and misleading" statements. For example,
95. U.S. SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO., 1997 ANNUAL PRoxY STATEMENT 27 (1997).
96. See THE MAY DEP'T STORES Co., ANNUAL PROxY STATEMENT 12 (Apr. 17,
1997). Unite withdrew a proposal submitted to Phillips-Van Heusen. Longview also
submitted a proposal to the Limited. See Environment Tops List of Social Issues in
1997 Season, CORP. Soc. ISSUES REP. (Investors Resp. Res. Center Soc. Issues Ser-
vice, Wash., D.C.), June-July 1997, at 4.
97. THE MAY DEP'T STORES CO., 1997 ANNUAL PROXY STATEMENT 12 (1997).
98. IRRC reports: "The 18 proposal[s] falling under this category more than dou-
ble last years' total of eight proposals." Checklist of 1997 Shareholder Resolutions,
CORP. Soc. ISSUES REP. (Investors Resp. Res. Center Soc. Issues Service, Wash.,
D.C.), Feb. 1997, at 18-24.
99. See, e.g., J.C. PENNEY, Co., INC., 1997 ANNUAL PROXY STATEMENT 26-27
(1997) (proposal submitted by United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of Amer-
ica recommending restriction of non-employee director pensions).
100. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(3) (1997).
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in submitting a proposal to separate the CEO and Chair of the
Board at Chase Manhattan Corporation, union proponents not-
ed that it is important for shareholders to focus on directors
because they make strategic decisions involving downsizing the
workforce. The supporting statement went on to note that
Newsweek featured the CEO of Chase in an article titled "The
Hit Men," which labeled the CEO a "corporate killer" and criti-
cized paying large salaries to executives at firms engaging in
downsizing."°1 The SEC allowed managers at Chase to omit
the language as misleading under 14a-8(c)(3).0 2
The SEC took a similar position when the Central Laborers'
Pension Fund filed a poison pill resolution at Knight-Ridder,
arguing that management had insulated itself by making a
hostile takeover of the company more difficult. Discussing the
negative effects of allowing such insulation, the union gave as
an example a prolonged strike against one of the company's
joint ventures that imposed heavy costs on the shareholders.
The union asserted: "[A] management attentive better attuned
to shareholder interests ... would have behaved differently
with respect to [labor relations policy]."1 °" The SEC stated
that Knight-Ridder could exclude the discussion of the strike as
misleading under 14a-8(c)(3). The labor union argued: "Even if
the Pension Fund's proposal were only a clear disguise for a
proposal about the Detroit strike, which it plainly is not, the
strike is hardly 'ordinary business."m104
I maintain that this censorship of shareholder communication
is highly inappropriate. As Bart Naylor of the Teamsters as-
serts regarding these exclusions: "Not only are we limited to
500 words for our supporting statement, we are not responsible
for refuting our own argument. Management can provide sup-
port for its statement in opposition to the proposal in the proxy,
for which it will have no space limit."105
101. See Allan Sloan & Anne Underwood, The Hit Men, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 1996,
at 44 (featuring CEOs of Digital, Scott, IBM and AT&T).
102. See Chase Manhattan, SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 63973, at *11 (Feb.
13, 1997).
103. Knight-Ridder, Inc. SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 765455, at *2 (Dec. 28,
1995).
104. Id at *3.
105. Chase Manhattan, supra note 102, at *7.
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4. Shareholder Resolutions Concerning Labor Practices
a. High-Performance Workplace Proposals
Following Secretary Reich's recommendations, labor-share-
holders filed proposals requesting reports on high-performance
workplace policies. In 1995, labor-shareholders submitted seven
of these resolutions; five came to votes, receiving an average
support of 12.5%1'--a high level for a new issue. In 1996, la-
bor-shareholders filed six high-performance workplace proposals;
two came to votes, receiving an average vote of 6.9%."7 In
1997, shareholders did not submit any high-performance
workplace resolutions."l~
When labor-shareholders first filed high performance
workplace proposals in 1995, the SEC had stopped issuing no-
action letters on whether managers could omit employment-
related proposals. At this time, the SEC was involved in litiga-
tion concerning whether the Cracker Barrel decision was proper
under the Administrative Procedure Act. After the Second Cir-
cuit held that the Cracker Barrel position was valid, the SEC
resumed issuing no-action letters and allowed managers to omit
high-performance workplace resolutions under the ordinary
business exclusion."° The SEC clarified:
106. See The High-Performance Workplace; U.S. Social Policy Shareholder Resolu-
tions in 1995, CORP. SOC. ISSUES REP. (Investor Resp. Res. Center Soc. Issues Service,
Wash., D.C.), Mar. 1996, at 24. The five companies included: Oshkosh B'Gosh-21.9%;
Amdahl-4.6%; Sears Roebuck-7.8%; Southwest Airlines-15.4%; U.S.Air Group-98.1%;
Louisiana-Pacific-7.6%. See Letter from Doug Cogan, Deputy Director, Social Issues
Service, Investor Responsibility Research Center, to Marleen O'Connor 1 (June 27,
1997) (on file with author).
107. See Linking Social Issues to Executive Compensation, IRRC CORP. Soc. ISS.
REP. (Investor Resp. Res. Center Issues Service, Wash., D.C.), June 1996, at 14-15.
Four other resolutions were filed: W.R. Grace (omitted); Northrop Grumman (with-
drawn); Morrison Knudsen (withdrawn due to technical error); Scott Paper (not voted
on due to merger). See id. at 19-24.
108. See Checklist of 1997 Shareholder Resolutions, CORP. SOC. ISSUES REP. (Inves-
tor Resp. Res. Center Soc. Issues Service, Wash., D.C.), Mar. 1997, at 17. In 1997,
the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners submitted a proposal to Chevron
requesting information about workers' health and safety policies. The union withdrew
the proposal after negotiating with management. See id. at 18.
109. See Capital Cites Comm., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 45002, at *24
(Mar. 14, 1984) (regarding a request that the company provide a written report of its
policies on wages, benefits, pensions, sick leave, vacations, hiring, discharging, and
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As a general rule, the staff views proposals directed at a
company's employment polices and practices with respect to
its non-executive work force to be uniquely matters relating
to the conduct of the company's ordinary business opera-
tions. Examples of the categories of proposals that have
been deemed to be excludable on this basis are: employee
health benefits, general compensation issues not focused on
senior executives, management of the workplace, employee
supervision, labor-management relations, employee hiring
and firing, conditions of employment and employee training
and motivation."
Following this policy, the SEC allowed managers to omit a
shareholder proposal requesting information on the cost of lay-
offs, including "lawsuits, legal defense costs, legal settlements,
cost of using more employees of less experience and qualifica-
tion and increased training expenses.""'
In response to the shareholder proposals regarding high-per-
formance workplace practices, managers provided their standard
rebuttals to requests for information. Some referred to the cost
of preparing the report," while others asserted that
workplace practices are proprietary information. Another firm
resisted by claiming the need to maintain flexibility to decide
what programs or practices are best for the company. Beyond
the standard rhetoric, managers criticized the DOL checklist as
too vague,"' particularly concerning questions regarding the
effectiveness of training programs.
Most institutional shareholders did not have guidelines to
follow when voting on the high-performance workplace share-
holder resolutions. Some institutions treated the topic like other
employment issues and voted against the proposals as ordinary
business matters. Others, such as CalPERS and NYCERS,
other matters).
110. United Technologies, SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 48821, at *10 (Feb. 19,
1993) (MacBride principles resolution).
111. General Motors Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 70756, at *6 (Feb. 15,
1995).
112. See SOUTHWEST AmLmES Co., 1995 ANNuAL PROXY STATEMENT 18 (1995).
113. See AxDAmL CoRP., 1995 ANNuAL PROXY STATEMENT 10 (1995). Another com-
pany responded that they already reported such information. See U.S. AIR, INC., 1995
ANNUAL PROXY STATEMENT 34 (1995).
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voted in favor of the resolutions based on policies that support
greater corporate disclosure."4
This overview of the history of shareholder resolutions re-
questing information about high-performance workplace practic-
es reveals limited experimentation following Reich's campaign
to promote the issue. This experience reveals that shareholders
need to tailor their resolutions to request specific quantifiable
measures about human-resource policies such as labor turnover
and training expenses per employee." 5
b. Global Labor Standards Proposals
Social activists have recently focused national attention on
child labor and global labor standards."6 Secretary Reich
launched a major campaign to eradicate sweatshops, en-
couraging socially responsible investment firms to "exercise our
rights as shareholders and file resolutions concerning sweat-
shop-related policies at company annual meetings.""7 In 1997,
religious and social activist groups submitted several sharehold-
er proposals involving requests to review international labor
standards and to compare executive salaries to wages paid to
workers in low-wage countries. These resolutions are at the
cutting edge of a global movement to increase consumer aware-
ness in order to improve workplace conditions in low-wage
countries.
114. See The High-Performance Workplace, supra note 106, at 24.
115. See infra text accompanying notes 203-05.
116. See Paula Green, Change of Venue for Sweatshop Row, J. COM, Feb. 26,
1997, at 9. "Anti-sweatshop activists are taking their fight from the newsroom to the
boardroom as they turn to shareholder meetings to try and force improvements in
labor conditions at apparel manufacturing plants." Id.; see also Lawmakers Introduce
Child Labor Label Bill, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 183, at 12 (Sept. 20, 1996) (re-
garding mandatory labeling system, reading "Child Labor Free"). The proposal for a
"child free label" builds on similar efforts, such as the RUGMARK label guaranteeing
that certain Asian rugs were not made by children and the "Green Seal" and other
environmental labels such as the "Dolphin-Safe" logo on cans of tuna. See Pamela M.
Prah, Child Labor: Employers, Labor Give Disparate Views on Ways to Curb Exploit,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 130, at 13 (July 9, 1996); see also, Steven Greenhouse,
Voluntary Rules on Apparel Labor Prove Hard to Set, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1997, at
10; Bruce Nolan, U.S. Consumers' Concern Grows Over Sweatshops: Disney Targeted
for Poor Wages, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 15, 1996, at A10.
117. Jennifer Owens, Holders Raid Sweatshop Issue at Disney, WOMEN'S WEAR DAI-
LY, Jan. 13, 1997, at 15.
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In 1997, shareholders submitted a highly publicized proposal
on sweatshops to Disney."' The first resolution requested a
report on Disney's suppliers' standards. The second proposal
sought a comparison of Disney's executive compensation with
the wages paid to Disney's workers in the United States and
three other countries. This resolution suggested adjusting the
salaries of contract workers to "ensure adequate purchasing
power and a sustainable community wage." At first, Disney
tried to exclude the proposals under the Cracker Barrel policy,
but later included the proposals after substantial negative press
reports." CalPERS submitted a third resolution questioning
executive pay practices. Importantly, CalPERS voted in favor of
the social activists' proposals, even though it typically does not
approve employment-related shareholder proposals.'
5. Shareholder Resolutions Concerning Plant Closings and
Downsizings
After Congress enacted plant closing legislation in 1988, the
SEC reversed a prior position treating plant closings as ordi-
nary business operations.'2' Specifically, the SEC viewed
shareholder requests to study the impact of plant closings as
involving social policy, but excluded proposals requesting that
managers refrain from shutting down particular facilities as
concerning ordinary business operations."2 Shareholders filed
plant closings proposals from 1988 through 1994. Although not
squarely addressed, it appears that the Cracker Barrel policy
excluding employment-related proposals does not prevent share-
holders from filing resolutions concerning plant closings."2
118. Wal-Mart, Inc. also went through a publicity nightmare after selling clothing
made by Kathie Lee Gifford. See Green, supra note 116, at 9.
119. See Nicole Volpe, Disney Accused of Using Haiti Sweatshops, REUTERS FIN.
SER. Feb. 26, 1997, at 1, available in LEXIS, Market and Industry Library, RFinan-
cial service file.
120. See Jerry Hirsch, Not All Smiles, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 21, 1997, at 36.
121. See Pacific Telesis Group, SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 WL 245523, at *3-4
(Feb. 2, 1989).
122. See General Electric Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 234020, at *13
(Jan. 29, 1988) (allowing exclusion of proposal to reverse decision to close a particular
plant on ground closing of facilities is a matter of "ordinary business operation).
123. See Telephone Interview with Frank Zarb of the SEC Corporate Finance Divi-
sion (June 25, 1997).
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Questions exist as to whether the SEC's view on plant
closings would allow shareholders to voice frustrations about job
loss resulting from downsizing. I believe that the SEC's position
on plant closings should encompass shareholder proposals re-
questing information about the impact of downsizings. In my
view, downsizing of the 1990s raises more politically sensitive
issues than the plant closings of the 1980s for five reasons.
First, in the past, managers imposed massive layoffs only when
companies' fundamental futures were at stake. Although corpo-
rate profits are at a twenty-five year high, corporations engage
in downsizing as strategic maneuvers to gain competitive ad-
vantages."
Second, whereas the layoffs of the 1980s hurt mainly young,
unskilled, blue-collar workers, the downsizings of this decade
affect a broad range of corporate America, including many more
older," skilled white-collar professionals, middle managers,
and even top executives. 6
Third, just in a few years, downsizing in the 1990s disman-
tled long-standing traditions of work in this country.' The
124. See Tom Brown, Sweatshops of the 1990s, MGMT. REV., Aug. 1996, at 13.
125. The most recent statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics show that the
risk of job loss is rising for workers in the 45 or older category. See JOB CREATION
EMYLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES: THE UNITED STATES LABOR MARKET, 1993-1996 (Council
of Economic Advisors with the U.S. Department of Labor, Working Paper, 1996).
Older workers are prime candidates for downsizing because management perceives
them to be more expensive and less flexible than younger workers. The Age Discrimi-
nation and Employment Act (ADEA) provides little protection. In Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, the Supreme Court held that deciding that the discharge of an employee
based on a factor empirically correlated with age, such as salary, does not establish a
prima facie case under ADEA. 507 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1993).
126. See AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, 1996 AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSO-
CIATION SURVEY: CORPORATE DOWNSIZING, JOB ELIMINATION, AND JOB CREATION 3
(1996).
127. A debate exists over whether job stability is declining. Some studies confirm
the media's perception of decreasing job stability caused by downsizing. See Kenneth
Swinnerton & Howard Wial, Is Job Stability Declining in the U.S. Economy, 48
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 293 (1996). These results, however, have been contested by
other economists. See, e.g., Francis X. Diebod et al., Comment on Kenneth A
Swinnerton and Howard Wial, Is Job Stability Declining in the U.S. Economy?, 40
IhNus. & LAB. REL. REV. 348 (1996). Swinnerton and Wial have subsequently shown
these criticisms to be incorrect. See Kenneth A. Swinnerton & Howard Wial, Reply to
Diebod, Neumark, and Polsky, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 352 (1996). Other
economists note that official figures suggest that the average length of job tenure is
about the same today as it was in the 1970s. See HENRY S. FARBER, ARE LIFETIME
JOBS DISAPPEARNG? JOB DURATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1973-1993, at 17, 25-26
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old employment compact of lifetime employment has evaporat-
ed. Employees have greater job insecurity, lower wages, and
more involuntary contingent work. Firms that drastically down-
size do not face severe reputational sanctions in the outside
labor market because "everyone is doing it." As a result, em-
ployees are "working scared" and feel that they are "lucky to
have a job."
Fourth, downsizing has become politically sensitive because
announcement of a planned downsizing sends stock prices up
an average of eight percent. Yet, many experts are concerned
about low employee commitment over time.1" Indeed, evidence
about long-term effects indicates that most companies suffer
more than they gain from this strategy. The American Manage-
ment Association conducted a recent study of downsizing over
the past five years and found that fewer than half of the firms
subsequently increased profits; only a third reported higher
productivity. 9
Finally, national debate has focused on downsizing because
as workers lose jobs, executives receive huge compensation
(Indus. Relations Section, Princeton Univ. Working Paper No. 341, 1995). Farber's
data suggests that men with little education are less likely to have long-duration jobs
today than they were 20 years ago, while educated women are substantially more
likely to be in long-duration jobs today than they were 20 years ago. Id. at 2. But
this may be due to "job lock." That is, an estimated 25 to 30 million people stay at
their current jobs because they fear losing their health insurance benefits, or accrue
higher pensions. See Philip F. Cooper & Alan C. Monheit, Does Employment-Related
Health Insurance Inhibit Job Mobility?, 30 INQUIRY 400, 407 (1993).
128. The press reports that younger workers assert:
rm not going to be like my dad and work till 10 o'clock at night and
never see the kids. What for? So I'll be thanked with a pink slip9 ....
[pleople are a lot less amenable to being absorbed into the work culture.
It's pay me, don't play with me. Don't give me an employee picnic.
They're acting like independent contractors.
N.R. Kleinfield, The Company as Family, No More, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1996, at A12.
Overlaying worker sentiments is an erosion of trust. See Gerald F. Seib, Loyalty Lost:
The Long Side of One Virtue, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1996, at A22 (stating "the most
telling development in American public life in recent years . .. has been the collapse
of loyalty." (emphasis omitted)). Worker surveys reveal that "70 percent of those
polled say they can't trust management" WILIjAM J. MORIN, SILENT SABOTAGE 93
(1995). Academic research has shown consistently that, while fear may motivate in
the short-term, prolonged uncertainty creates a fall in employee morale and productiv-
ity, which is hard to halt, let alone reverse. See FREDERICK REICHHELD, THE LOYALTY
EFFECT 95 (1996) ("Experience has shown us that disloyalty at current rates stunts
corporate performance by 25 to 50 percent, sometimes more.").
129. See REICHHIELD, supra note 128, at 95.
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increases.1 0 Prominent corporate leaders suggest that the in-
creased use of stock options and other forms of incentive
schemes encourage managers to cut the workforce.' 31 The me-
dia uses these events to publicize the growing inequality of
wealth distribution in this country. 32 Wealth and income are
distributed more unevenly in the United States than in any
other industrialized country. In addition, income disparity con-
tinues to grow faster here than elsewhere, leading corporate
leaders to become concerned about class warfare. Historians
note that America's relative lack of class consciousness has had
a profound influence in shaping our country." However, re-
cent evidence indicates that rhetoric concerning class distinc-
tions in the 1990s is similar to that of the 1940s.1M
6. Many Employment-Related Proposals Raise Significant
Policy Issues
Labor law and securities law restrict the ability of labor-
shareholders to raise strategic business issues that affect em-
ployment either as workers or as shareholders. Under the
NLRA, only wages, hours, and working conditions are mandato-
ry subjects of collective bargaining, whereas business decisions
are management prerogatives. One of the most important court
130. Real wages have fallen. The DOL reported early in 1996 that median real
wages for full-time workers are nearly three percent less than they were in 1979.
Executive compensation has risen to nearly 200 times that of the average worker,
compare with only 40 times that of the average worker 20 years ago. In contrast,
comparable ratios in Europe and Japan have remained stable during this period be-
tween 15:1 to 25:1. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and
Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990).
131. See John Plender, Job for Life Has Vanished, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1996, at
A22.
132. See Richard B. Freeman, Toward An Apartheid Economy, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 114, 116.
133. See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT 2-3 (1991).
134. See S.M. Miller & Karen Marie Ferroggiaro, Class Dismissed?, AM. PROSPECT,
Spring 1995, at 100, 101. Compared with people of other industrialized countries,
Americans have a high tolerance for income inequality. See generally SEYMOUR MAR-
TIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD (1996). Perhaps one
reason European-style welfare systems have not developed in the United States is
that many Americans believe in the "American dream," that they, and especially their
children, may acquire wealth and that this dream is more readily achieved in Ameri-
ca than in Europe.
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decisions concerning the "managerial prerogatives" doctrine is
the Supreme Court's decision in Fibreboard Paper Products v.
NLRB."' In his famous concurrence, Justice Stewart stressed
that certain decisions "lie at the core of entrepreneurial...
control [and are excluded from the scope of collective bargaining
because they] are fundamental to the basic direction of a corpo-
rate enterprise."3 '
Just as labor law restricts unions' ability to discuss strategic
corporate decisions through collective bargaining, so the securi-
ties laws limit shareholders from raising these questions
through proxy contests. In allowing managers to omit a resolu-
tion requesting information on the impact of a strike,"' the
Southern District of New York recognized:
That is not to say that a subject that can be raised in col-
lective bargaining always must be treated as "ordinary
business operations." However, the availability of collective
bargaining to resolve the issue does make it apparent that
the issue is not so extraordinary that a shareholder vote is
the only forum or the most effective forum in which it can
be raised.'
I assert the SEC should treat many employment-related is-
sues as raising significant policy issues because paternalistic
merit regulation is unnecessary in the current environment of
sophisticated institution investors. "' Consider Robert Reich's
response to the Cracker Barrel decision: "There's a legitimate
argument to be made that if a company is substantially in-
volved in an important issue facing the country that transcends
135. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
136. Id. at 223. This influential opinion reflects business leaders' views that re-
strictions on the scope of collective bargaining are necessary to preserve "American-
style capitalism." Charles E. Wilson, the president of General Motors in 1948 stated:
"Only by defining and restricting collective bargaining to its proper sphere can we
hope to save what we have come to know as our American system and keep it from
evolving into an alien form, imported from east of the Rhine." JAMES ATLESON, VAL-
UES AND ASSUMTONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAw 147 (1983).
137. See Austin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 788 F. Supp. 192, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
138. Id.
139. The most persuasive argument for this position comes from Brandies' maxim:
"Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient police-
man." Louis D. BRANims, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANES s USE IT
92 (1914).
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that individual company, then shareholders ought to be permit-
ted to vote on that company's role."4 ° The SEC should include
employment-related proposals to allow shareholders to debate
how their firms should respond to fundamental transformations
in the economy.' We are in the midst of the third economic
revolution as firms adjust to rapid technological change and
global competition. The economy is undergoing such radical
changes that no one knows what American-style capitalism will
look like in the future. It is clear, however, that the corporation
of the 1950s is very different from that in the 1990s. In the
1950s, unions were powerful and shareholders were passive. In
the 1990s, institutional shareholders are strong and unions are
weak. By allowing shareholders to evaluate employment poli-
cies, the SEC could take a large step toward restoring legitima-
cy to the American corporation that was lost during the 1990s.
In sum, the efficacy of the institutional shareholder move-
ment in promoting employment concerns depends on its proxy
power. Shareholder proposals focusing on diversity, global labor
standards, and equal employment have risen over the years. At
this time, however, workplace practices involving employee
empowerment and training have not received as much atten-
tion. In the next Part, I analyze the complex political and eco-
nomic factors that influence how institutional shareholders view
employment-related shareholder proposals.
III. THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF LABOR'S CAPITAL
In this part, I use a political-economic framework to evaluate
the potential for labor's capital to promote workers' interests in
the new economy. This perspective reveals that corporate gover-
nance has much more life than the bland world of Coasean
economic thinking suggests. Norms have a powerful influence in
the institutional shareholder community. These norms are
140. Stuart Silverstein, Proxy Vote on Hiring Matters Urged, LA TIMES, Nov. 5,
1996, at D2.
141. John Coffee notes the issue is "why shareholders, as the owners of the com-
pany, should be able to impose normative restrictions on their corporation's behavior.
Ruling an entire area of corporate activity [such as employee relations] off-limits to
moral debate effectively disenfranchises shareholders." John C. Coffee, Jr., Blocking
Bias Via Proxy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1993, at A14.
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shaped not by economic forces alone, but by personalities, poli-
tics, and power. To fully evaluate labor's efforts to wield its
pension power, we need to consider the following issues:
(1) the public's perception of unions;
(2) internal union tensions;
(3) labor-shareholder legitimacy among other institutional
investors;
(4) political pressure on public pension funds;
(5) managerial domination of private pension funds;
(6) management efforts to resist labor-shareholder activism;
and
(7) the political-economic constraints of the global economy.
In analyzing these factors, we find that various alliances
form and dissolve as the political and economic landscape un-
dergo transition. For example, during the hostile takeover era
of the 1980s, unions allied with managers against public pen-
sion funds to pressure state legislatures to enact anti-takeover
legislation.' State legislatures responded to rhetoric that
takeovers cause job loss, although the evidence does not estab-
lish a casual relationship between these two events.' In ally-
ing with managers to lobby state legislature to anti-takeover
statutes, unions hurt their interests as shareholders without
gaining much as employees.' Specifically, the stakeholder
statutes allow managers to hide behind vague duties to various
constituents to protect their own interests. In layoff and plant
closings unrelated to takeovers, managers are the first to argue
against any form of legislation to protect workers.
When the takeovers of the 1980s ended, the 1990s decade of
downsizing and reengineering followed, disrupting old alliances
and fostering new coalitions. The tables are turned as the
142. For further analysis of stakeholder statutes, see Marleen A. O'Connor, Sympo-
sium: Corporate Malaise-Stakeholders Statutes: Cause or Cure?, 21 STETSON L. REV.
1 (1991).
143. See Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts:
Recognizing A Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1189,
1201, 1227-28 (1991).
144. See id.
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shareholder activism movement brings public pension funds
together with labor-activists against managers. We find unions,
which once pushed for anti-takeover legislation, have now be-
come leading proponents of resolutions to redeem poison
pills. 45 For example, unions joined the American Trucking As-
sociation (ATA) in trying to prevent takeovers of trucking com-
panies."4 The ATA is currently one of the strongest opponents
of labor-shareholder activism.47
In these debates, opposing groups use rhetorical arguments
about short-termism to further their different positions."4 For
example, the Business Roundtable resisted altering the proxy
rules in 1992, stating that institutional investors should not
play a significant role in corporate governance because they do
not invest for the long-term." In response, labor unions stat-
ed: "Enhancement of shareholder voting rights and the proxy
process generally may also help reverse the tendency on the
part of some investors, including pension funds, to be short-
term investors." 0 Additionally, William Patterson, Director of
the new AFL-CIO Office on Investment, announced labor's plan
to develop better gauges of long-term value to expand
companies' horizons to protect workers' interests. 5'
In this Part, I focus on the dynamics of the possible coalition
between public pension funds and labor-shareholders to promote
high-performance workplaces. Specifically, I assert that econom-
ic factors may converge with political forces to push institution-
al investors to promote new performance measures involving
workplace practices. On the economic front, the distinctive fea-
ture of the new economy is human capital, providing labor and
shareholders with more common ground than they have had in
145. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 2 (manuscript at 112).
146. See Trucking Industry Unions Urge Halt to Illegal Takeovers of Transport
Firms, Sec. L. Daily (BNA), at 10 (Aug. 15, 1991).
147. See Jim Lewis, Business Leaders Attack Union "Corporate Campaign" Tactics;
Call for Congressional Inquiry, (Am. Trucking Ass'n News Release, Wash., D.C.), Sept.
21, 1995 (on file with author).
148. "IT]he rhetoric of anti-short-termism like the rhetoric of patriotism is simple
and widely supported." ROE, supra note 10, at 243.
149. Nell Minow, Proxy Reform: The Case for Increased Shareholder Communica-
tion, 17 J. CORP. L. 149, 154-55 (1991).
150. Letter from Sixteen International Union Presidents to Commissioner Breedan
(May 7, 1991) (on file with author).
151. See Bernstein, supra note 40, at 110.
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the past. On the political side, organized labor is taking a lead-
ing role to educate pension fund beneficiaries about growing
wage inequality, job insecurity, and pension fund governance.
Whether labor-shareholders succeed in wielding their pension
power to further employment-related goals in this manner re-
mains to be seen. We must keep in mind, however, that politics
can only go so far. As Ron Gilson asserts: "while politics may
check the influence of markets; so too markets can check the
influence of politics."5 ' In this respect, global labor markets
may severely hinder the prospects for labor-shareholders to
advance worker capitalism.
A. Public Perception of the Labor Movement
The new AFL-CIO President, John Sweeney, is seeking to
revitalize the labor movement by increasing union member-
ship 153 and promoting corporate governance reforms. I review
three political features of labor-shareholder activism that facili-
tate union endeavors to increase membership, even when these
efforts are not part of corporate campaigns. First, labor-
shareholders' innovative corporate governance reforms receive
favorable media attention, which portrays organized labor as a
potent force to confront managerial power. Second, labor-share-
holder activism destroys the perceptions created under
Taylorism that workers are not competent to make strategic
business decisions. Third, exercise of labor's shareholder rights
is politically acceptable because it is consistent with both share-
holder supremacy and democracy in corporate governance.
Labor-shareholders receive positive media attention for shak-
ing up the traditional boardroom culture in order to make exec-
utives more accountable to shareholders. Specifically, journalists
describe unions as "rabble rousers" using "strong-arm, coercive
tactics" to push corporate governance reform."5 From the per-
152. Gilson, supra note 29, at 358; see also Mark Roe, The Modern Corporation
and Private Pension, 41 UCLA L. REv. 75, 93 (1993) ("Culture often breaks down
when money can be made.").
153. See Aaron Bernstein, Sweeney's Blitz: He Wants to Turn Labor into a Lean,
Mean Recruiting Machine, BUS. Wi., Feb. 17, 1997, at 56.
154. The Teamsters submitted a nonbinding proposal to require the Board of Direc-
tors to redeem its poison pill defense and not to adopt a similar measure without
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spective of potential members, this type of media coverage tem-
pers the constant barrage of news items describing unions as
weak and ineffective "social dinosaurs" of the industrial age.
Second, union efforts to make boards more accountable alter
managers' perceptions of workers' interests in the enterprise.
Historically, unions did not support reform proposals for Ger-
man-style co-determination because labor was content to leave
board decision making to managers under "job conscious
unionism."' Unions in the United States did not focus upon
challenging the "system" that established managers as "think-
ers" and workers as "doers."5 ' Managers also resisted the no-
tion of co-determination, arguing that corporate strategy should
be left to those with knowledge of finance, economics, and law.
Unions' efforts to reform corporate governance institutions alter
this conceptual world and transform power relationships in the
American corporation. Labor-shareholder activism will continue
to destroy old stereotypes as organized labor further promotes
the employees' role in corporate governance by pursuing board
seats.'57
shareholder approval. The court rejected the Board's response that the shareholders
did not have the power to adopt this bylaw change. See International Bhd. of Team-
sters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., No. Civ. 96-1650-A, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2980, at
*1 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 24, 1997); Binding Bylaw Amendments to Mark 1998 Shareholder
Resolution Activity, CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL. (Investor Resp. Res. Center Corp. Gov-
ernance and Shareholder Service, Wash., D.C.), Oct.-Dec. 1997, at 1.
155. Historians have long debated the issue of why socialism did not develop in
the United States. I highlight two of the most prominent factors. First, unlike the
movements in Europe, the AFL did not set as its prime goal the improvement of the
working class as a whole. Labor historians emphasize that the American labor move-
ment did not develop a strong working class consciousness because the United States
has a heterogenous population and a greater possibility of upward class mobility.
Second, during the decades around the turn of the century, the American courts nar-
rowly interpreted many labor statutes, dimming the trade unionists' views of what
was possible through political action. These narrow judicial interpretations were not
just the result of hostility to labor, but stemmed from the courts' perspective of its
role in relationship to the legislature and an unwillingness to serve as arbiter of
labor disputes. See generally DAVID BRODY, IN LABOR'S CAUSE: MAIN THEMES ON THE
HISTORY OF THE AMERICA WORKER (1993); WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAP-
ING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991).
156. See FREDERICK TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 32
(1911); see also HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADA-
TION OF WORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 126 (1974) (stating "the separation of
hand and brain is the most decisive single step in the division of labor taken by the
capitalist mode of production").
157. In 1997, the Teamsters submitted a resolution to DuPont asking managers to
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Finally, although labor's use of its pension power has the
potential to revolutionize corporate governance, labor-sharehold-
er activism is not only feasible, it is also politically acceptable.
Importantly, these strategies do not require labor law reform.
Unlike organized labor in other developed countries, American
unions lack support from a worker-based political party. As
unions lose members, they lose political clout."ce Even under a
Democratic administration, the national political climate does
not favor unions. In contrast, labor-shareholder activism re-
ceives a large degree of bi-partisan political support because it
does not fundamentally challenge the basic structure of Ameri-
can capitalism.
Although history reveals that labor laws usually develop to
placate violent worker uprisings against general economic condi-
tions,"9 pension funds capitalism developed without this type
of struggle. One of the paradoxes of labor's capital is that it
arose mainly from private sector initiatives rather than from
government action." ° One commentator emphasizes that the
evolution of labor's capital highlights that beneficial public pol-
icies can emerge by allowing the private sector to experiment
with new institutional forms. 6' This insight is particularly
important to keep in mind when considering labor-shareholder
activism. Given the growing concerns over worker backlash
against corporate restructuring, union strategies to use the
democratic processes governing shareholder debate may serve
as an important safety valve to maintain corporate legitimacy
in an increasingly uncertain economic environment.
appoint a labor representative to the Board of Directors. The resolution received a
3.5% vote, compared to 4.9% support in 1996. See Checklist of 1997 Shareholder Reso-
lutions, CoIRP. Soc. IssuEs REP. (Investors Resp. Res. Center Soc. Issues Service,
Wash., D.C.), June-July 1997, at 17-24.
158. Only 11% of the private sector workforce is unionized. See Susan Dentzer,
Anti-Union, But Not Anti-Unity, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 17, 1995, at 47.
159. See Alan Hyde, A Theory of Labor Legislation, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 383, 411-12
(1990) (describing German co-determination result of worker uprisings).
160. See DRUCKER, supra note 32, at 167.
161. See id. at 168-69.
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B. Internal Union Politics: Beneficiaries' Interests Versus
Member Concerns
In evaluating labor's use of its pension power, one needs to
consider the conflicts that arise among different groups of work-
ers."6 2 Solidarity is never an easy matter, but it becomes even
more difficult when firms must make painful adjustments. La-
bor-shareholder activism to promote corporate campaigns aggra-
vates the tension between younger workers interested in job
security and older workers concerned with comfortable retire-
ment."
Although senior union members would support efforts to
increase pension fund benefits under defined contribution plans,
the new union rhetoric of "shareholder value" must seem a bit
strange to long-time members who remember the days when
the goal was to decrease "profits."" At the same time, labor-
shareholder activism is not so radically different from the ap-
proach taken by organized labor in the past. Unlike labor move-
ments abroad, American unions have a long history of commit-
ment to the free enterprise system. Labor-shareholder activism
is consistent with this tradition because it exercises power
according to a fundamental principle of American capitalism-
shareholder supremacy.
The Jimmy Hoffa scandals, however, continue to haunt un-
ions. Thus, labor leaders need to be cautious in expending re-
162. See Simon, supra note 13, at 259.
163. Henry Hansmann has highlighted the potential for intra-worker conflict in
employee-owned firms and has discussed the problems worker-owned firms have as a
result of worker heterogeneity. See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTER-
PRISE 97-98 (1996).
164. Teresa Ghilarducci discusses labor-shareholders' growing influence in the
Council of Institutional Investors (CII):
The corporate members in the CII argued that shareholder value would
improve. However, labour convinced enough of the state, local, and teach-
er pension plan members that the CII should not support all moves for
wealth-maximization and, in particular, should reject those that would
weaken pension security .... Labor (in a coalition) was able to convince
a significant proportion of shareholders that preserving jobs, supporting
an incumbent management, and protecting well-funded defined-benefit
pension plans were in the interest of shareholders as a whole.
Ghilarducci et al., supra note 13, at 38.
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sources on goals that will not directly benefit pension benefi-
ciaries. Indeed, the Taft Hartley Act of 1947" mandated the
trust for collectively bargained funds in order to distance pen-
sion funds from the control of union officials."
C. Labor-Shareholder Legitimacy Among Institutional
Shareholders
Labor-shareholder activism magnifies problems inherent, not
only in intra-union decision making, but also in intra-sharehold-
er politics. Despite their different interests, labor-shareholders
are respected players within the institutional shareholder circle.
Labor leaders William Patterson of the AFL-CIO and Ed
Durkin of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners
served terms as president of the Council of Institutional Inves-
tors (CH), a Washington-based group of activist funds. In addi-
tion, labor-shareholders have made efforts to educate other
investors in CII about high-performance workplace practices
and new performance measures for human-resource values. 67
Because public pension funds have the greatest voting power,
labor-shareholders carefully choose issues that these funds
support such as redeeming poison pills, .revising executive com-
pensation, and declassifying boards." At this stage, unions
cannot push employee issues too hard, because their use of the
proxy process is highly controversial. In a few instances, howev-
er, labor-shareholders formed coalitions with other pension plan
members to convince CII members that preserving jobs was in
the interests of shareholders as a whole. 69
D. The Political Dimensions of Public Pension Funds
Although most public pension funds vote with managers on
employment-related shareholder proposals, this position may
change in the future. These public funds are politically sensitive
165. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-91 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1997).
166. See id. § 186(C) (Cure. Supp. 1997).
167. See Telephone Interview with Matt Aueillo of the Council of Institutional In-
vestors (June 11, 1997).
168. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 2 (manuscript at 103-06).
169. See Ghilarducci et al., supra note 13, at 38.
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to employment issues because fund managers are elected by
beneficiaries or appointed by governors.' At this point,
CalPERS is the only fund that has taken steps to promote
high-performance workplaces.'' These efforts, however, appear
to be political posturing for the most part. In launching their
program to evaluate labor practices, officials from CalPERS
assert: "With this structure in place, America will see an end to
what's been called 'the looting of corporate America's human
capital. '"" '2 Similar to corporate executives, public fund man-
agers use this "statesmanlike" rhetoric as part of public rela-
tions campaigns. These efforts are significant, however, because
they indicate that public pension funds are politically receptive
to new performance measures focusing on workplace practices.
In time, CalPERS may take the lead in prompting other insti-
tutional investors to analyze human-resource values.
E. Managerial Domination of Private Pension Funds
In thinking about how to encourage institutional shareholders
to evaluate high-performance workplace practices, one needs to
distinguish between public pensions and private pensions. Un-
like public funds, corporate managers dominate most private
funds, the largest holders of equity. For these reasons, private
funds, with some exceptions such as Campbell Soup's pension
find, do not participate in even mild proxy activities.'
In focusing on private pension funds, one must further differ-
entiate between defined benefit funds and defined contribution
pension plans."'4 The ongoing expansion of defined contribu-
170. See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 796 (1993) (noting that "[plublic fund managers
must navigate carefully around the shoals of considerable political pressure to temper
investment policies with local considerations, such as fostering in-state employment,
which are not aimed at maximizing the value of their portfolios' assets"); see also
Judith H. Dobrzynski, Is Pete Wilson Trying to Mute A Shareholder Activist?, Bus.
WK., July 1, 1991, at 29.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
172. Koppes, supra note 56, § 3, at 13.
173. See Roe, supra note 152, at 77.
174. For "defined benefit" plans, the pension fund is simply collateral for the prom-
ise of a defined level of retirement payout to be made by the employing firm. The
employer has a direct financial interest in the plan because the employer is liable to
make up a funding deficiency, which means that firm's shareholders still bear the
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tion pension funds, which now surpass defined benefit
plans,175 may have significant implications for corporate gover-
nance. Specifically, fund managers of defined contribution plans
are not chosen by corporate managers and, thus, are more like-
ly to engage in shareholder activism." In addition, approxi-
mately one-quarter to one-third of the assets in defined contri-
bution plans are invested in company stock, representing the
single largest asset. For defined contribution plans, Margaret
Blair suggests that we encourage investments up to ten percent
of assets into the sponsoring company and that employees re-
ceive voting control over this block of stock because they bear
the investment risk.Y
7
Even without these reforms, economic pressures may build to
the point where cultural restraints that allow managers to
control private pension funds will break down. Specifically,
Mark Roe emphasizes that, in the past, market forces during
the hostile takeover era caused private fund managers to tender
their shares, even though such actions hurt incumbent manag-
ers.'78 In a similar manner, market pressures in the knowl-
primary risk. When insolvency leads to employer default, the Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corporation (PBGC) honors the firms' defined benefit pension promises. Thus, it
is appropriate, in this dimension, that financial managers be accountable to company
managers.
In the other main pension plan alternative, "defined contribution plans, em-
ployees are the beneficial owners of the pension investments. In these plans, the
employer's only obligation is to make contributions during the period a worker is
employed. After retiring, an individual receives whatever amount has accumulated. As
a result, the sponsoring corporation has no direct financial interest in the perfor-
mance of the fund's investments. With fixed contributions, the future pension is vari-
able, but the beneficiary gains more control over investment policy and ownership of
the fund which follows the employee in job changes. See WILIn M. O'BARul & JOHN
M. CONLEY, FORTUNE AND FOLLY: THE WEALTH AND POWER OF INSTITUTIONAL INVEST-
iNG 103, 104 (1992).
175. Defined contribution plans have recently gained importance. In the 1980s, the
shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pension funds began. In 1983, de-
fined benefit fimds were double those in defined contribution plans. By 1995, defined
contribution surpassed defined benefit plans. See O'BARR & CONLEY, supra note 174,
at 104.
176. See Roe, supra note 152, at 104-07.
177. See MARGARET BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 337 (1995). Under ERISA,
private defined-benefit plans can invest up to ten percent of their portfolios in the
stock of the sponsoring companies. Private defined-contribution plans are not restrict-
ed. See id.
178. See Roe, supra note 152, at 95 ("[Alithough there is no preexisting analog to
the raiders, new institutions could break down the cultural barriers," preventing ac-
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edge-based economy may prompt private fund managers to vote
for proposals to promote human-resource values. In addition,
Roe suggests that increased job mobility could raise workers'
demands for self-directed pensions, which would also decrease
the amount of managerial control over labor's capital."'
For worker capitalism to succeed, there needs to be increased
worker education about how pension funds operate and enhance
communication between fund beneficiaries and trustees. Al-
though public pension officials have regular contact with their
beneficiaries,"s private pension executives are largely insensi-
tive to working class interests, because they have little direct
interaction with employees below executive levels.'' In high-
lighting -this cultural gap, Michael Useem notes that private
pension fund managers tend to identify with corporate manag-
ers, who also tend to major in finance in the same M[BA pro-
grams at elite business schools.8 2 Labor-shareholders are tak-
ing steps to correct this communication gap by using the
Internet to provide information to workers about how to contact
pension fund managers about their views on proxy issues.
F. Managers' Efforts to Restrict Labor-Shareholder Activism
Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin report that managers
have made two attempts to reform the law to impede labor-
shareholder activism. First, they requested that the SEC
change the securities laws to exclude labor-sponsored resolu-
tions from annual proxy statements when unions are negotiat-
ing collective bargaining agreements or engaging in organizing
a campaign." Second, managers urged Congress to make it
an unfair labor practice for unions to use shareholder resolu-
tions as part of their corporate campaign tactics.' Public
tivism by private fund managers.).
179. See id. at 115.
180. See id. at 269.
181. See USEEM, supra note 16, at 277.
182. See id.
183. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 2, at 43. In 1994, during the longest strike
in U.S. trucking history, the union submitted proposals at the three largest trucking
companies involved.
184. See id.
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* pension funds opposed both these legal restrictions, fearing that
managers would impede their efforts as well.
Recently, Thomas and Martin conducted a study finding little
difference between the average percentage of votes cast for
allegedly "abusive" labor-shareholder proposals and the average
votes cast for other corporate governance proposals." Such
proposals receive a slightly lower percentage of favorable votes
than other labor proposals, but the differences are not statisti-
cally significant." Thomas and Martin assert that other
shareholders are suspicious of labor-shareholders' motives and
that this political constraint will prevent unions from abusing
their pension power. 8 For this reason, I agree with their con-
clusion that the SEC should take a neutral position and treat
labor-shareholders like other shareholders.
G. Global Markets: Economic Forces Versus Political
Constraints
Labor's capital must adapt to the complex configuration of
opportunities and constraints posed by the global economy. In
the new era of open economies and global capital flows, multi-
national corporations freely engage in regulatory arbitrage in a
world without boundaries." These firms search the globe
seeking the lowest cost and most exploitable labor. Multination-
al corporations are beginning to encounter political backlash as
social activists bring issues concerning global labor standards
into the forefront of national debate. If social activists can keep
public outrage and consumer pressure focused on these issues,
then societal norms will turn these political concerns into eco-
nomic pressures. More specifically, advocates for legislative
reform provide "sweat-free labels" to guarantee that products
are not produced with child or exploited labor.'89 Although the
use of the label would be voluntary, companies would face in-
creased penalties under Federal Trade Commission law for
185. See id. at 45.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 45-46.
188. See generally WILLIAM GREmER, ONE WORLD READY OR NOT (1997).
189. Lawmakers Introduce Child Labor Label Bill, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 183,
at D-22. (Sept. 20, 1996).
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fraudulent use of the label. In addition, the Clinton administra-
tion is pushing to have labor standards included as part of
GATT. These efforts suggest that consumers will increasingly
focus upon labor standards as part of products' quality consider-
ations. In the future, the AFL-CIO can play an important role
as independent monitor to assure investors and consumers that
firms comply with industry codes and international labor stan-
dards.
The AFL-CIO is making a renewed commitment to support
workers around the world as part of an expanding movement to
empower global unions." ° In establishing this goal, John
Sweeney warned corporate leaders of the importance of estab-
lishing global labor standards to prevent "massive social
unheaval." 9' In the past, the AFL-CIO's efforts to enforce in-
ternational labor codes were criticized as protectionist. The
public, however, is beginning to recognize that these jobs are
not going to return to developed countries." In the United
States, the popular perception is that the globalization of the
economy only affects low-skilled workers. This view, however, is
quickly changing as engineers and computer analysts lose jobs
to low-cost, but highly skilled technical labor in less developed
countries.'93 As white-collar workers increasingly lose jobs to
workers abroad, political pressures will rise to temper economic
forces in an ever-evolving competitive global economy.
IV. CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE OF
HUMAN-RESOURCE VALUES
I maintain that labor-shareholders should use the federal
securities laws to promote employees' interests by filing share-
holder resolutions focused on publicizing corporations' workplace
190. See GREIDER, supra note 188, at 15.
191. See AFL-CIO: Sweeney Calls on Economic Forum to Create Economy to 'Lift'
Workers Up, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at A-4 (Feb. 3, 1997).
192. See Richard Rothstein, The Case for Labor Standards, 20 BOST. REV. 2, S 13
(Dec. 1995-Jan. 1996) <http-//www.polisci.mit.edu/bostonreview/BR20.6lRothstein.html>.
193. See generally JOHN HAY, JOINT VENTURE: SILICON VALLEY NETWORK, 21ST
CENTURY BLUEPRINT 48 (1993); JEFFREY HENDERSON, THE GLOBALIZATION OF HIGH
TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTION: SOCIETY, SPACE AND SEMICONDUCTORS IN THE RESTRUC-
TURING OF THE MODERN WoRLD (1989); David R. Howell, The Skills Myth, THE AMER-
ICAN PROSPECT, Summer 1994, at 1.
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practices. The usefulness of the current disclosure system in the
knowledge-based economy is limited. Specifically, readers of
financial statements do not have adequate information about
the value of human-resources because accounting and disclosure
guidelines focus on physical, rather than human capital. Disclo-
sure of information about human-resource values is necessary
to educate the investment community about firms' ability to
adapt to quickly changing market conditions. In addition, shock-
ing news reports about multinational corporations' exploitation
of workers in low-wage countries suggest the need for greater
public reporting. Labor-shareholders' use of Rule 14a-8 to re-
quest information about these issues will facilitate the debate
over the scope and structure of disclosure and whether it
should be voluntary or mandated.
Disclosure of human-resource practices is an important corpo-
rate governance tool that is more politically acceptable than
substantive regulation because the United States has strong
cultural norms in favor of transparency." This proposal is
consistent with political notions about the role of public knowl-
edge in a democracy as well as the role of information in effi-
cient capital markets. Corporate disclosure of workplace practic-
es would promote a more informed dialogue among patient
shareholders, managers, and workers, setting in motion a virtu-
ous circle. Specifically, managers may find such disclosure to be
in their interests because it will help them attract long-term,
patient capital to protect themselves from the volatility of the
stock market. As investors begin to request more information
about workplace practices, managers will devise new measures
to indicate human-resource values, leading to more investment
in training and workforce development.
A. The Need For Further Research on Workplace Practices
At the outset, I emphasize that while pioneering scholarship
offers insight about appropriate performance measures for
workplace practices, much uncharted territory exists. Many
assertions about the measurement and disclosure of human
resources are not supported by statistical analysis.'95 At least
194. See Lowenstein, supra note 28, at 1344.
195. Many institutions around the world are beginning to conduct this research.
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six fundamental issues need further research. First, there is a
need for more quantitative analysis to link performance mea-
surements, such as turnover and training hours per employee,
to the bottom line. The studies so far do not produce definitive
conclusions. Even if this research can isolate quantitative ef-
fects and establish mathematical correlation, causation remains
uncertain in a dynamic economic environment. Second, we need
to investigate how many companies have implemented new per-
formance measures to evaluate human resources. Third, we
need further empirical research concerning the value of human
capital. Fourth, I have conducted a study to evaluate the na-
ture and degree of current disclosure practices for human-re-
source values of the Fortune 500 companies." We need to de-
termine whether such disclosure differs for high-technology
companies in the fields of chemicals, drugs, electronics, soft-
ware, biotechnology, and telecommunications. Fifth, we need to
know how firms evaluate information concerning workplace
practices when they formulate their strategic policies. Sixth, we
need to analyze how external reporting of this information will
affect the market valuation of corporate stock. Hence, the im-
plementation of a human-resource disclosure system is not
without complication.
B. Strategies for Shareholder Activism to Promote Disclosure
In thinking about the evolution of employment-related disclo-
sure, it is appropriate to examine the history of environmental
reporting because labor markets are rapidly becoming global in
nature. The Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility and
Union Organizations began the Coalition for Environmentally
Responsible Economies (CERES), which publishes annual
scorecards on corporate environmental policies. The major goal
of CERES is to formulate a standardized method of informing
investors about the environmental aspects of businesses.
CERES' major impact is as a catalyst; they target high-visibility
New York University recently formed the Intangibles Research Center, at the Vincent
C. Ross Institute of Accounting Research, Stern School of Business, to consider these
issues. Baruch Lev is the Director.
196. See generally Marleen A. O'Connor, Rethinking Corporate Financial Disclosure
of Human Resources for the Knowledge-Based Economy (May 1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).
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firms that take the lead to use disclosure as public relations
plays. These firms establish benchmarks other corporations
follow to avoid negative publicity and government regulation.
Shareholder resolutions requesting information about environ-
mental polices receive high votes because NYCERS and
CalPERS favor these proposals to increase corporate disclosures.
The development of environmental disclosure practices illus-
trates that there may be no need for regulation or explicit in-
dustry standards to enhance corporate disclosure of human-
resource values.
In contrast to the more advanced state of environmental
disclosure, however, corporations often refuse to provide infor-
mation to shareholders about employment issues. In the past,
when social activists filed Freedom of Information Act requests
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
the agency did not challenge accepted corporations' assertions
about the need for confidentiality.97 Although shareholder
proponents have made great strides in this area, a recent IRRC
survey indicates that companies are disclosing less information
on equal employment over the past few years. " '
C. The Types of Disclosure About Workplace Practices
In using shareholder proposals to prompt corporate disclosure
of human-resource values, quantitative data is preferable to
qualitative information. In deciding which quantitative mea-
sures to request, we do not have to limit our thinking in terms
of placing dollar values on human resources. Rather, investors
are concerned with metrics that reveal changes over time and
among firms."' I recently conducted a study that reveals that
most of the firms that disclose quantitative measures concern-
ing human resources use non-monetary terms." ° Quantitative
measures standing alone, however are inadequate. Firms need
197. See RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 132 (1976).
198. See Susan Williams, Equal Employment and Disclosure: A Report on U.S.
Corporate Practices, CORP. Soc. ISSUES REP. (Investor Resp. Res. Center Soc. Issues
Service, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 1996, at 1 (surveyed 1,500 U.S. publicly traded companies;
10% release EEO-1 reports compared with 19% in 1993).
199. See EDVINSSON & MALONE, supra note 15, at 50-51, 58 (stating that numbers
"make the data more tangible and dynamic").
200. See generally O'Connor, supra note 196.
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to supplement the quantitative analysis with narrative explana-
tions of the meaning of key indicators and why these measures
change.
201
The first step in thinking about appropriate indicators to
assess human resources is to consider the dramatic changes in
the employment relationship that have taken place in recent
years. 0 2 Firms need to disclose the amount of decentralized
decision making in the workplace. In this regard, firms should
provide information regarding the following: (1) the number of
management levels and (2) the number of company managers
assigned to full-time permanent employees. Investors need to
know the extent to which firms empower workers in cross-func-
tional teams. To evaluate these issues, firms should disclose
information regarding policies on job rotation, job enrichment,
and promotion. A good indicator of the networked organization
is the number of employees in the firm compared to the total
number of employees in the firm's alliances. Other important
figures include the number of full-time permanent employees,
full-time permanent employees who spend less than fifty per-
cent of their time at corporate facilities, full-time temporary
employees, part-time contractors, as well as full-time contrac-
tors. Such information indicates the extent to which the firm
leverages its human resources.
When evaluating human resources, investors need data about
the quality of the workforce. To evaluate employee competence,
investors need disclosure about the education and training of
the workforces. As far as education is concerned, firms should
disclose the percentage of managers with advanced business,
science, engineering, and liberal arts degrees, as well as foreign
language abilities. Reports about salary levels, classified by
skill and type of employee are important, as well as data about
the average years of service with the firm broken down by
various categories of the workforce.
201. When describing appropriate measures about human resources, I follow many
of Skandia's guidelines. See EDVINSSON & MALONE, supra note 15, at 17, 18.
202. See THOMAS A. KOCHAN, The American Corporation As An Employer: Past,
Present, and Future Possibilities, in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY 242, 246-50
(Carl Kaysen ed., 1996).
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The topic of the quality and quantity of training is especially
important under the new employment contract."' Specifically,
companies have lower incentives to invest in long-term employ-
ee development, yet the new organizational practices depend
more than ever on a well-trained workforce. As a result, disclo-
sure about a firm's training program needs to reflect how the
firm balances these competing considerations. To assess the
firm's investment in training, investors need data concerning
the training cost per employee as well as the number of hours
employees spend in upgrading their skills. To evaluate the
firm's return for these investments, investors need to assess
data concerning employee turnover. However, low turnover
rates do not necessarily indicate high returns to the firm on
investments in specific human capital. On the other hand, a
high rate of quits indicates low returns to the firms on invest-
ments in specific training.
Although these lists of measurements are useful to assess the
value of human resources, they do not fully capture the nature
of the workplace.2 Providing such information to investors,
however, would substantially sharpen the picture presented
under current disclosure standards. Some investors may choose
to ignore the data, but that is not a persuasive argument
against providing the information. Many investors would prefer
to make their own decisions regarding the usefulness of the
type of disclosure, rather than not see it at all."5 Eventually,
workplace information needs to be linked with specific line
items, such as earnings and cash flow. For the time being,
providing data about labor relations will push firms and inves-
203. See Michael Useem, Corporate Education and Training, in THE AMERICAN
CORPORATION TODAY 292, 313-15 (Carl Kaysen ed., 1996). Useem states that short-
term shareholder demands and widespread downsizing pressure have not reduced
corporate investments in education and training. See id. at 310. ("Analysis of 406
large firms surveyed in 1991 reveals that companies that had downsized were [more]
likely to direct donations to public schools, to excuse employees to teach in public
schools, and to value apprenticeship programs with public schools").
204. Skandia hired an independent organization to survey employees in order to
create an employee empowerment index. See EDVINSSON & MALONE, supra note 15, at
132. The employee survey evaluates motivation, support services, awareness of quality
demands, responsibility levels and competence. See id. I do not recommend external
reporting regarding employee surveys because the data may be biased.
205. See BRANCATO, supra note 16, at 15.
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tors to continue to experiment with innovative disclosure con-
cerning the workplace.
V. CONCLUSION
The labor movement, [for all its shortcomings,] is the only
force in society that expressly represents working families.
The problem is that the 'Chain Saw" Dunlaps have too
much power, and the rest of us have too little.
John Sweeney
President, AFL-CIO2"
The media debate over downsizing presents a classic David
and Goliath scenario, portraying struggling, jobless workers
versus top executives raking in multimillion dollar pay pack-
ages. But like many populist issues, the scenario presented for
public consumption by politicians and pundits is vastly oversim-
plified. Robert Reich reported: "I don't think we should
demonize individual CEOs or vilify corporations. That's an easy
way of avoiding far more fundamental questions of the proper
role and function of the modern corporation."" 7
Moving beyond political rhetoric to evaluate economic issues,
we find that as American corporations restructure to respond to
global market changes, a fundamental paradox arises. Downsiz-
ing has weakened the traditional ties of job security and loyalty
that bind employees to firms;2 8 at the same time, decentral-
ized decision making and cross-functional teams increase the
firms' dependence upon human capital. This paradox has creat-
ed a strong interest among corporate law and labor scholars to
reshape our governance structures to reallocate decision making
in a manner that will encourage investments in human capi-
206. JOHN SWEENEY, AMERICA NEEDS A RAISE 4, 5 (1996). Dunlap eliminated a
third of jobs at Scott Paper Co., raising its stock value by $6.5 billion. See ALBERT J.
DUNLAP, MEANS BUSINESS: How I SAVE BAD COMPANIES AND MAKE GOOD COMPANIES
GREAT 17 (1996) (He made $100 million during his 18 months at the company).
207. Diane Stafford, Blame trickles up for downsizing; Push for profits pits CEOs
against increasingly angry American workers, THE KANSAS CITY STAR, Feb. 23, 1996,
at Al.
208. See PETER DRUCKER, POST-CAPITALIST SOCIETY 66 (1993); Michael C. Jensen,
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems,
48 J. FIN. 831 (1993).
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tal.' The goal of these proposals is to promote a high degree
of worker commitment while maintaining the firms' flexibility
to adjust to rapid technological change. 10 Ron Gilson high-
209. For the most part, corporate scholars have focused on issues pertaining to
capital, avoiding issues about employees, just as labor law scholars confined their
focus to employment, avoiding questions concerning corporate governance. Over the
past few years, a growing interest in the intersection of corporate and labor law has
emerged in response to the dramatic changes in corporate organizational forms. In
reaching this topic, corporate law scholarship reflects a degree of path dependence.
Issues regarding directors' obligation to workers arose during the hostile takeover,
many states enacted stakeholder statutes permitting directors to consider the interests
of employees in response to political rhetoric that takeovers cause job loss. Once hos-
tile takeovers died down, corporate scholars turned their attention to the rise of insti-
tutional shareholders and comparative corporate governance. Most of the discussion
about institutional shareholders focused on reducing agency costs and did not consider
that the pension funds' beneficiaries are workers. Similarly, the comparative gover-
nance debate focused on the role of the main bank in Germany and Japan, without
considering how employees influence these corporate governance systems. Given the
nature of this path, discussions about workers could not be avoided.
Many labor law scholars were following a path that eventually required them
to consider corporate governance issues. Specifically, the decline of unions has left a
"representation gap" in the American workplace. To fill this gap, many labor scholars
have considered work councils and employee ownership. These topics raise questions
about how directors should balance the competing interests of workers and sharehold-
ers.
For an overview of the economic perspective of the employees' role in the theo-
ry of the firm, see MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL (1995); MARGARET
M. BLAIR, WEALTH CREATION AND WEALTH SHARING: A COLLOQUIUM ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND INVESTMENTS IN HUMAN CAPITAL (1996) (recommending a reduction
in the conflict between shareholders and employees through expanded use of equity-
based compensation systems). See also Aleta G. Estreicher, Beyond Agency Costs:
Managing the Corporation for the Long Term, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 513, (1993) (ana-
lyzing proposals to increase managers' time horizons); Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
Labor and the Corporate Structure; Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities,
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (1988) (recommending codetermination).
210. Many academics who once strongly advocated reform proposals to adopt Ger-
man-style labor practices recognize that such regimes are currently under pressures
for change that were difficult to predict just a few years ago. See Colin Crouch &
Wolfgang Streeck, The Future of Capitalist Diversity, in POLMCAL-ECONOMY OR MOD-
ERN CAPITALISM? (Colin Crouch & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1996) (stating that the
socio-economic model of a high-wage economy with relatively egalitarian wage disper-
sion and effective democratic participation, in the political system and the workplace,
appears on the defensive). Specifically, the new economy favors firms that make rapid
adjustments to dramatic technological innovations. This notion casts doubt on the
viability of slow moving institutional arrangements that seek broad consensus from
various corporate stakeholders before making changes.
I have also advocated a German-style model of corporate governance, which I
call the neutral referee model. I have translated Masahiko Aoki's economic model of
the Japanese firm into legal language by asserting that directors should owe fiduciary
obligations to shareholders as well as workers. See Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human
Capital Era: Reconceptionalizing Corporation Law to Facilitate Labor-Management
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1345
lights that the American system offers high flexibility, but low
commitment; while, on the other hand, the German system
offers high commitment, but low flexibility.2 '
In reconceptualizing labor's role in the corporate structure,
significant developments in worker participation in decision
making in larger organizations are more likely to take place
within the context of the existing corporate forms. For this
reason, many scholars favor providing greater worker participa-
tion in corporate governance through some form of employee-
ownership. Although most worker-shareholders do not actively
participate in corporate governance at this time, organized
labor's use of its pension power has had a powerful impact on
the institutional shareholder movement.
Unions have linked up with potential allies to seize opportu-
nities for public education concerning workplace practices. A
collaboration among unions, religious groups, and socially re-
sponsible investors seeks to promote high-performance
workplace practices and expose corporations that exploit labor.
In these ways, labor-shareholders advance the interests of
workers by capitalizing on investors' interest in finding differ-
ent performance measures and the growing concerns about the
legitimacy of the publicly held corporations. Using these strate-
gies, labor-shareholder activism may become a significant coun-
tervailing force to promote worker capitalism in a rapidly
changing economic environment.
Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 899, 946-65 (1993); Marleen A. O'Connor, Global
Capitalism and the Evolution of American Corporate Governance Institutions, in PER-
SPECTIVES ON COMPANY LAW 2, 89 (Fiona Patfield ed., 1997).
211. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency:
When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327 (1996).
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